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JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code

§ 78A-4-103(j).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Do the absurd results and constitutional avoidance canons of statutory
interpretation vest the court with the power to invalidate a statutory amendment and
®

rewrite unambiguous statutory language in a manner that is inconsistent with legislative
intent?
Standard of Review. "' Judicial review of license revocations by municipalities is

limited to a determination whether the municipality acted within its lawful authority and
in a manner that is not arbitrary or capricious."' Mike 's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St.
George City, 2015 UT App 158, ,r 14,353 P.3d 626 (quoting Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v.
City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ,r 42, 1~ P.3d 581). A municipal license revocation
@

decision is not arbitrary or capricious if it is supported by "'substantial evidence in the
record.'" Id. (quoting 14th St. Gym, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2008 UT App 127, 110,
183 P.3d 262). Under the substantial evidence standard, this Court's reviews the City
Council's license revocation decision as if it were reviewing the decision directly,
affording no deference to the district court. See Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85,111,200

@

P.3d 182; Pen & Ink, LLC v. Alpine City, 2010 UT App 203, ,r 16,238 P.3d 63.
Preservation. This issue was preserved in the parties' briefing and in the district

court's decision. (R. 624-641, 317-342, 344-382.)
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Central to the outcome of this appeal are the following statutes, the relevant
portions of which are reproduced at Addendum 3.
•

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(g)(i) (LexisNexis 2012)

•

Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-8(l)(a) (LexisNexis 2012)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
This matter arises from an appeal of a business license officer's revocation of

Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts' business license for trafficking in a controlled substancethe drug analog "spice"-in violation of Utah law. Mike's appealed the revocation to the
St. George City Council. After a hearing, the City Council affirmed the revocation.
Mike's petitioned for judicial review in the district court asserting that there was not
substantial evidence in the record to support the City Council's decision, and that Utah's
controlled substance analog definition was unconstitutionally vague.
The district court did not reach the merits of either claim. It concluded instead that
there were disputed issues of material fact raised by conflicting expert reports. It
reversed and remanded the matter to the City Council to hold an evidentiary hearing and
consider live testimony from the competing experts.
The City appealed to this Court, arguing that the district court applied the wrong
legal standard. This Court agreed and reversed and remanded with instructions to the
district court to analyze the license revocation appeal under the arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal standard. See Mike 's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts, 2015 UT App 15 8, 1 16. On remand,

2
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the district court issued a detailed decision affirming the City Council. Mike's now
@

appeals.

II.

Statement of Facts.
A.

Legislative efforts to stop "spice" trafficking.

For context, we first summarize the statute at issue: Utah Code section 58-372(1)(g)(i), which defines controlled substance analogs such as "spice." See Utah Code
@

Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(g)(i) (LexisNexis 2012).
"Spice" is marketed as a "legal" alternative to drugs, often labeled "not for human
consumption," and containing "shredded plant material and chemical additives that are
responsible for their psychoactive (mind-altering) effects." (R. 346.) 1 Spice
manufacturers evade legal restrictions "by substituting different chemicals in their
mixtures" thus staying a step ahead of legislative attempts to list these various mixtures
as controlled substances. (R. 346-347.) The Utah Legislature has tried to get out in front

~

of these problems. In 1997, it amended Utah's Controlled Substances Act to define drug
analogs. See 1997 Utah Laws Chap. 64, § 2 (codified as Utah Code Ann.§ 58-372(t)(i)(A), (B) (amended 2011)). In this initial definition, to qualify as a controlled
substance analog the law required an initial showing that the substance had a
substantially similar chemical structure and next required either: (A) a substantially
similar effect as a listed controlled substance; or (B) a representation as having such an
effect. See 1997 Utah Laws Chap. 64, § 2.

~

1

Citing www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/spice-synthetic-marijuana (last
visited Oct. 23, 2013).

~
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In 2011, the Legislature revisited and amended the statute to expand the list of
controlled substances as well as the definition of a controlled substance to include
synthetic equivalents to cannabinoid substances (marijuana) and their analogs found in
spice products. See 2011 Utah Laws Chap. 12, §§ 2, 3 (codified as Utah Code Ann.§§
58-37-2(1)(g)(i), -4.2 (amended 2012)).
Only a year later, during the 2012 General Session, the Legislature again amended
the statute with the enactment of House Bill 254. The driving force behind this
amendment was the substantial increase in emergency room incidences involving spice,
something the Legislature was attempting to curtail. See AV Recording: House Debate
of H.B. 254, 59th Gen. Leg. Sess. (Feb. 17, 2012) (comments of Rep. Froerer). 2 The
Legislature was concerned that chemists were changing th~ molecular structure of
substances in the slightest of ways to avoid falling under one of the listed controlled
substances in Utah's Controlled Substances Act, thus staying one step ahead of the law.

See id. (comments of Rep. Froerer); see also AV Recording: Senate Debate of H.B. 254,
59th Gen. Leg. Sess. (March 1, 2012) (comments of Sen. Christensen). 3
The Legislature's 2012 amendment sought to eliminate this activity. See id.
Additionally, the amendment was intended to define a controlled substance analog as a
substance with a substantially similar chemical structure of a listed controlled substance
without having to submit proof of its effects. See id. (comments of Sen. Christensen). In

2

Available at http://le.utah.gov/--2012/bills/static/HB0254.htm1 (Day 26).

3

Available at http://le.utah.gov/--2012/bil1s/static/HB0254.html (Day 38).
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fac t, the enrolled copy of H.B. 254 highlighted the fact that it was ame nding "the
definitio n of a controlled substance analog to allow proof that the substance is chemically
substantially similar to a controlled substance, w ithout requiring proof of the effect of the
substance b y the expert testimony of a pharmacologist." H.B. 254 (enrolled copy).4
To achieve these goals, the Legislature changed the statute's text and grammatical
structure, inserting a colon after "' Controlled substance analog ' means" and moving the

•

opening clause-which required an initial show ing o f a "substantially siniilar" che mical
structure-down to a new subsection, thereby creating three separate subsections, and
connecting them with the term "or." The changes track as follows: 5
(g) (i) "Controlled substance analog" means...:.

{Al a substance the chemical structure o f which is substantially similar to
the chemical structure of a controlled substance listed in Schedules I and II of
Section 58-37-4, a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 , or in Schedules I
and II of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513[-=-J..i.

[W J (B) a substance which has a stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to
the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
syste m of controlled substances [in the schedules set forth in Subsection
(l )(f), or a substance listed in Section 58 37 4 .2 ; or] listed in Schedules I
and II of Section 58-37-4, substances listed in Section 58-37-4.2 , or
substances listed in Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances
Act, Title II. P.L. 91-513: or

•

[ElB] (C) A substance which, with respect to a particular individual, is
represented or intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of
controlled substances [in the sch edules or list set forth in this Subsection (-BJ
listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, substances listed in Section
58-37-4.2, or substances listed in Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled
4

Available at http://le.utah.gov/~2012/bills/static/HB0254.html.

5

We have highlighted in b lue and red the revi sions that are s ignificant here.
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Substances Act, Title ll,P.L.91-513.

2012 Utah Laws Chap. 297 (codified as Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2(l)(g)(i) (LexisNexis
2012)) (emphasis added). This amendment took effect on May 8, 2012. See id.

B.

The Drug Task Force targets Mike's; the City revokes Mike's business
license.

Municipalities are authorized to regulate "retail tobacco specialty businesses"
within their borders through business licensing requirements. See Utah Code Ann.§ 108-41.6 (LexisNexis 2012). This includes revoking these licenses if authorized by the
provisions of any state law or local ordinance. See id. § l 0-8-41.6(6)(b ). St. George City
has adopted an ordinance regulating retail tobacco specialty businesses. See St. George
City, Utah, Code§ 3-9-1.6 It allows the City to revoke a tobacco sales business license if
the licensee, owner, operator, or an employee while on business premises, violates any
laws or regulations related to alcohol or controlled substances, or commits any felony
level offense. See id.§§ 3-9-S(A); 3-1-19.
Petitioner/Appellant Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts ("Mike's") is a retail tobacco

•

specialty business. (R. 42.)7 The City issued Mike's a business license to sell cigarettes,

•
6

The St. George City Code is available at http://www.sterlingcodifiers.com/
codebook/index.php?book id=399.
7

We recite the facts as found by the City Council below, and as contained in the
administrative record. (R. 42-49) (City Council's findings and conclusions); (R. 36-316)
(administrative record).) The administrative record was numbered as AR. 00001-00275,
which corresponds to the record at R. 36-316 as paginated by the district court clerk. The
trial record has been numbered twice, once manually (first appeal) and once
electronically (on this appeal), which resulted in a different pagination. This brief cites to
the more recently paginated electronic record.
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•

cigars, tobacco pipes, lighters, oil burners, incense, flavored tobacco, sports memorabilia,
~

novelty items, perfume, and calling cards. (R. 42.)
In early 2012, the Washington County Drug Task Force began investigating
Mike's for possible spice distribution. (R. 43.) During the course of the investigation,
Mike's employees told Task Force officers that Mike's did not sell spice because it was
illegal, but they did sell products they referred to as "aroma therapy." (R. 43.) The Task
Force made various undercover buys of these "aroma therapy" products. (R. 43.) Based
on these buys, the Task Force obtained and executed a search warrant. (R. 43.)
During execution of the search warrant, a detective interviewed store manager
Kyle Best ("Best"), who is also the son of Mike's co-owner, Christie Best. (R. 42-43.)
Best told the detective that Mike's had tested the "aroma therapy" products and also
consulted with its attorney about the law. (R. 69.) Best said he was told to call the
product "aroma therapy'' and that he tells customers that if they smoke it they will go to
jail. (R. 43.) Despite its "aroma therapy'' label, he indicated that he only sells the
product to people over 19-years-old. (R. 43.)
From July 2012 through January 2013, the Task Force made additional undercover
buys. (R. 43.) During these transactions, the "aroma therapy" product-dubbed
"Rebom"-was behind the counter, concealed from public view. (R. 43.) The packets
containing the Reborn did not have barcodes like the other products in the store. (R. 43.)
Rather, employees scanned a sticker on the side of the cash register's monitor to enter the

~

price when selling it. (R. 43.)

~

7
STG_647892

Based on this information, in January 2013 the Task Force obtained and executed
another search warrant. (R. 43.) Multiple packets of "Reborn" were seized from behind
the counter, out of public view, and also from a safe in the back room. (R. 43.) Best was
interviewed again and responded affirmatively when asked if the names given to the
@

spice-"Rebom" or "aroma therapy"-were simply a camouflage to skirt law
enforcement investigations. (R. 43.)
The Task Force sent the products to the Utah Bureau of Forensic Services (the
Utah State Crime Lab) for testing. (R. 43.) Three different tests confirmed that the
products contained XLRl l. (R. 43.) According to the state crime lab, XLRl 1 is a
structural analog of AM-694, which is a listed controlled substance under Utah Code
section 58-37-4.2(4). 8 (R. 43.)
Best was charged with possession with intent to distribute under Utah Code
section 58-37-8(1)(A)(iii), a third degree felony. (R. 352; 425-449.) Shortly after Best's·
initial appearance, the City's business license officer sent an order revoking Mike's
business license and ordering the owners to stop conducting business in St. George. (R.
42.)9

8

Utah Code section 58-37-4.2, which lists the controlled substances, provides: "The
following substances, their analogs, homologs, and synthetic equivalents are listed
controlled substances: ... (4) AM-694; 1-[(5-fluoropentyl)-lH-indol-3-yl]-(2-iodophenyl)
methanone;" Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-4.2 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
9 Best pleaded no

contest in his criminal case after the district court denied his motion
to dismiss. (R. 425-449.) That motion asserted that drug analog statute was
unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Best, Criminal No. 131500096 (5th Dist. Ct.,
Washington Cnty.). (R. 425-449.)

8
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C.

The City Council affirms the revocation.

Mike's appealed the license revocation to the City Council and requested a
hearing. (R. 42.) At the hearing, both Mike's and the City were represented by counsel
who presented arguments and documentary evidence. (R. 42; R. 298-304.) As Mike's
explained below, the facts were never really in dispute. (R. 481, 509-510 - Hr'g Tr.
29:13-25, 30:1-10.) Based upon the evidence presented, the City Council issued findings
of fact and conclusions of law, affirming the business license officer's revocation,
concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to demonstrate that Mike's
possessed and sold a controlled substance analog with intent to distribute in violation of
Utah Code section 58-37-S(l)(a). (R. 42-49.) The evidence before the City Council, and
its corresponding findings are as follows.

1.

Reborn (XLR-11) has a substantially similar chemical structure to
the listed controlled substance AM-694.

At the City Council hearing, each side submitted writings prepared by their
experts, along with curriculum vitaes and related information about the experts. (R. 148165; 219-224; 232-255.)
The City submitted reports from the state crime lab along with the credentials of
the state crime lab and the forensic scientist at the lab who actually tested the "Reborn,"
Terry Lamoreaux. (R. 148-165; 219-224.) Lamoreaux examined the samples obtained

.

from Mike's and concluded that they contained XLR 11, which Lamoreaux determined
was a structural analog of AM-694. (R. 44; 159-165.) This conclusion was based on the
fact that the tests showed that XLR 11 and AM-694 had a common core structure with a

9
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single point of divergence. (R. 44; 159-165.) Each of Lamoreaux's reports was signed
and verified under "criminal penalty of the State of Utah." (R. 160, 163, 165.)

@

Mike's presented no evidence to call into question the state crime lab's
accreditations or procedures, or Lamoreaux's skills or qualifications. (R. 44; 36-316.)
Instead, it submitted written statements from Karl De Jesus, Ph.D., and Owen Michael
McDougal, Ph.D. (R. 44; 246-250, 252-255.) Neither De Jesus nor McDougal actually
tested or analyzed the substances at issue. (R. 44; 246-250, 252-255.) The City Council
examined each letter and concluded that in each the two experts merely offered their
opinion that XLRl 1 should not be considered-an analog of AM-694. (R. 44; 246-250,

@

252-255.)
In his opinion letter, De Jesus referred to Utah law prior to the 2012 amendment, a
point that the City Council found significant. (R. 44.) Based on the former law, De Jesus
opined that XLRl 1 is a synthetic cannabinoid; that the structure was substantially
different from AM-694; that the effect on the nervous system was less potent with
decreased hallucinogenic effects; and therefore, in his opinion, the product should not be
considered an analog of a controlled substance. (R. 44.) McDougal's opinion letter did
not address Utah law. (R. 44.) Instead, McDougal discussed the molecular structures of
AM-694 and XLRl 1 and the chemical effects of the substances. (R. 44.) Both letters
appeared to be generic in nature, addressing various substances.in addition to XLRI 1.
(R. 246-250, 252-255.) Neither letter was signed or verified under oath or criminal
penalty of the State of Utah. (R. 250, 255.) The DeJesus letter was not signed at all. (R.
250.)

10
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Mike's experts also provided information to the City Council which enabled it to
@

confirm Lamoreaux's conclusions. Specifically, Mike's own experts provided twodimensional drawings for each substance, which allowed the City Council to compare
and reasonably conclude there was a structural similarity between XLR-11 and AM-694.
(R. 640; 253, 257.)

2.

The surrounding, undisputed evidence confirms the criminal nature

of Mike's trafficking operation

Turning from the experts to the surrounding evidence, the City Council found that
Best knew the product Mike's sold as "aroma therapy'' was being ingested by at least
some of the people who purchased it-despite the fact that Mike's marketed it as "aroma
therapy" and labeled it not for human consumption. (R. 44.) Best also admitted to
(i)

smoking it himself. (R. 44.) Best ordered the Reborn, which was manufactured by a
company known only as "GOS," location unknown. (R. 44.) Mike's co-owner, Mike
Connors, said Mike's got its "aroma therapy" products from a male he only knows by a
first name, and relied on Best to work with attorneys to clear it. (R. 45.)
When a task force officer asked Best for a copy of the test results for "Reborn,"
Best provided a report from a company known as AIBio Tech. (R. 44.) The test results
were for 36 chemicals but the product was not tested for any analogs and did not identify

<i

the chemical makeup of the product. (R. 68.) The lab report was addressed to a business
listed as "DVS" with a St. George address but no such business existed at that address,
and no business called "DVS" had a business license with the City. (R. 44.)

11
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Best had offered "Reborn" for sale in the store for at least six months. (R. 44.) He
moved the "Reborn" under the counter behind the cash register because people were
stealing it and had burglarized the store to get to it. (R. 44.) 10 He explained that Mike's
St. George store sells the "Reborn" for $10 a packet and averages 50 to 60 packets a day.
(R. 44.) The product comprised approximately 40% of Mike's daily sales. (R. 43.)
Best did the ordering and admitted that the owners are aware of and approve items
that are offered for sale, and told him to sell this product. (R. 44-45.) He would not sell
the product to any person that asked for "spice," but would only sell it to customers who
asked for it by its name. (R. 45.) Best admitted that the labels placed on the spice
products - "Reborn" and "aroma therapy''-were a camouflage to skirt law enforcement
investigations. (R. 45.) He knew customers smoke it or ingest it like marijuana,
including one elderly man who smokes it for his cancer and comes in every other day.
(R. 45.) Best admitted that it made him sick when he ingested it. (R. 45.)
When asked why he hid the Reborn rather than putting it in the glass display case
in front like most retailers would do with their hot-selling products, Best responded that
moved it because he did not have room for the "Reborn" out front, that he had made it
@

easier for him to grab, and that it would get stolen. (R. 45.) Connors indicated that the
"aroma therapy" products were hidden behind the register because he believed that
displaying it made it illegal. (R. 45.) He also put it out of view so kids could not get to
it. (R. 45.)

10

There is no evidence that Mike's ever once reported the burglaries to police.

12
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Mike's other co-owner, Christie Best, told Task Force officers that she was not
"dumb," and that she knew what people were doing with the "aroma therapy'' products.
(R. 45.) Customers told her that they were smoking it. (R. 45.) She said the "Reborn"
product was kept behind the counter and in the safe, and that she left the testing of the
product up to Best. (R. 45.) She confirmed that when the store is broken into, Reborn is
the first thing stolen. (R. 45.)
The manager of Mike's Washington City store also admitted to seeing people
smoke the "aroma therapy'' in the parking lot, and customers admitted to her that they
@

smoked it-as she had on one occasion. (R. 45.) As with the St. George store, she kept
the product hidden behind the counter in the Washington store and required customers to
specifically request it in order to buy it. (R. 45.)
Mike's never once disputed the fact that the product it sold or possessed with
intent to distribute contained XLRl I. (R. 44; R. 481, 509-510 [Hr'g Tr. 29:13-25, 30:1-

@

10 (conceding fact to district court)].)

3.

The City Council's determination and conclusions.

Based on these facts and evidence, and after considering all of the arguments and
materials submitted by the parties, the City Council concluded that the product that
Mike's sold "contained XLRl 1, an analog of AM-694." (R. 47.) The City Council
further concluded that "the evidence establishes that XLRl 1 is an analog of AM-694, a
listed controlled substance, and that Mike's Smoke Shop sold and possessed product with
GD

the intent to distribute that contained XLRI I in violation ofU.C.A. 58-37-8." (R. 47.)
Among other things, in making this finding the City Council found it significant that the
13
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state crime lab actually tested the substance on three different occasions; whereas Mike's
experts never tested the substance at all. (R.4314) (City Council findings emphasizing
the term "tested" three different times); R. 44 ,I 6 (finding that the "experts for Mike's
Smoke Shop did not test or analyze the actual products").)
The City Council then concluded that, "based on the totality of the facts, there is
substantial evidence that Mike's Smoke Shop, its owner and employees, had the requisite
knowledge and intent to commit a violation of the law by distributing, or possessing with
the intent to distribute, analogs of an illegal substance. This evidence," the City Council
continued, "goes far beyond what is required for a business license revocation, but is

@

demonstrative of the weight of the evidence supporting the decision to revoke Mike's
Smoke Shop's business license." (R. 48.) Thus, the City Council upheld the business
@

license officer's decision to revoke Mike's business license and ordered Mike's "to cease
conducting business in the City of St. George .... " (R. 49.)

D.

The district court affirms the City Council.

Mike's filed a petition for judicial review in the district court. (R. 1-8.) Its
petition asserted two claims: ( 1) that there was not substantial evidence in the record to
®

support the City Council's decision, and (2) that "Utah's controlled substance analog
definition is unconstitutionally vague under both the federal and state constitutions." (R.
1-8.) After full briefing and two hearings, the district court affirmed the City Council's

@

decision. (R. 624.)
Mike's appeals.

@
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Mike's presents this appeal as a question of statutory interpretation.

Statutory interpretation is an effort to determine legislative intent. The starting point in
that effort is the plain language of the statutory text. In reviewing that text, we assume
the Legislature meant what it said and used each term advisedly. Here, the Legislature
amended Utah Code section 58-37-2(l)(g)(i) to redefine controlled substance analogs.
That amendment changed the text and structure of the drug analog definition by moving
the predicate showing from the opening clause (to show a substantially similar chemical
structure) to a subordinate subsection, equal to what was previously two subordinate
subsections. After creating three separate subsections, the Legislature connected them
with the term "or," thereby mandating a disjunctive interpretation so that only one of the
subsections need be satisfied, not all.
By its plain language, under section 58-37-2(l)(g)(i), a substance need only have
@

one of three things to qualify as a controlled substance analog: (A) a substantially similar
chemical structure as a listed controlled substance; (B) a substantially similar effect as a
listed controlled substance; or (C) is represented as having such an effect. See Utah Code
Ann.§ 58-37-2(l){g)(i). That is how the City Council interpreted the statute. That
interpretation, fully informed by the facts, is correct and must be affirmed.
2.

Mike's concedes that this is what the Legislature meant and intended. But

it argues that the Court should read subsection (A) conjunctively with either subsection
(B) or (C)-exactly how it read prior to amendment-based on federal court
interpretations of the federal drug analog definition. It contends that if the Court reads
15
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the statute as written it could lead to absurd results or constitutional challenges. But the
conjunctive reading that federal courts labored to find in the federal statute resulted from
ambiguities in the text of the federal statute which are conspicuously absent from the
Utah statute. Those ambiguities made it possible for the federal courts interpreting the
federal statute to read it conjunctively. In the absence of any ambiguity in the Utah
statute, Utah courts are not at liberty to apply the absurd results or constitutional
avoidance canons to rewrite statutory text in a manner contrary to its plain language and
legislative intent.
3.

Mike's assertion that the Court must interpret the statute contrary to its

@

plain language to avoid possible constitutional challenges is nothing but a _veiled facial
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. That was Mike's original claim. But as
@

the case has progressed, Mike's has refused to follow through on its challenge, opting
instead for the constitutional avoidance canon and hypotheticals about the statute's
application to others. When the statute is applied to Mike's, however, any constitutional
infirmities evaporate. A party has no standing to advance constitutional vagueness
challenges on behalf of others when, as applied to that party, there is a set of
circumstances under which the statute is valid. This is so because "'[a] plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of
@

the law as applied to the conduct of others,"' the court should "' examine the
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law."'

Greenwood v. City ofNorth Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991) (quoting Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)). A
16
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@

review of the facts forecloses Mike's claim that the City "interpreted" the statute in an
@

unconstitutional manner.
This is not a case about the general public not knowing what the law is. It is not
about various hypotheticals that pose the question of whether caffeine, ginseng, flour,
Doritos, or energy drinks fall within what the statute proscribes. Vagueness does not rise
or fall on the basis of hypotheticals because anyone can spin "hypertechnical theories as
to what the statute covers." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000). When there is
"no uncertainty regarding the statute's proscription of [the defendants'] conduct, we

@

refuse their invitation to conjure conditions under which the statute could be vague."
State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ,r 45, 100 P.3d 231. Here, there is certainty as to the
statute's application to Mike's. That forecloses Mike's veiled constitutional challenge on
vagueness grounds.
4.

GE>

Finally, even if the Court reads Utah Code section 58-37-2(1)(g)(i)

conjunctively (and it should not), it must still affirm. Mike's failed to challenge the City
Council's fact findings. Those fmdings establish that subsections (A) and (C) were
satisfied. The City Council found that XLR-11 has a substantially similar chemical
structure as a listed controlled substance. And the irregular and clandestine activities
which surrounded Mike's purchase and sale of Reborn and "aroma therapy'' products can
certainly lead a reasonable mind to conclude that Mike's represented and intended to
have the same effects as a listed controlled substance. Even under Mike's conjunctive
reading, the statute is satisfied. The Court should affirm.

17
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ARGUMENT

I.

The Framework for Reviewing a Business License Revocation.
A.

The arbitrary, capricious, or illegal standard of review.

This appeal arrives at the Court (for the second time) on review of a business
license revocation. But even after this Court reiterated the long-established arbitrary,

©

capricious, or illegal standard of review and remanded to the district court to properly
consider it, see Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 UT App 158,, 14,
353 P.3d 626, Mike's refuses to acknowledge the standard. At no point in its brief does
Mike's specify whether it is challenging the City Council's decision on the basis that it is
arbitrary and capricious, or on the basis that it is illegal.
A decision is arbitrary and capricious if there is not substantial evidence in the
record to support it. See Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts, 2015 UT App 158,, 14. Under
this standard, the reviewing court does not "reweigh the evidence," but instead
"'consider[s] all the evidence in the record, both favorable and contrary, and determine[s]
whether a reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the [c]ity."' Id. (quoting

14th St. Gym, 2008 UT App 127, , 10) (last alteration original).
A decision is illegal "if it violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time
the decision was made." Hodgson v. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 188, 17,334 P.3d
484 (quoting Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85,111,200 P.3d 182). Under this standard,
illegality may result from an incorrect interpretation of an applicable statute, in which
case the Court reviews a determination of illegality for correctness, but in doing so
"'afford[s] some level of non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced by"' the
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@

City. Fox, 2008 UT 85, ,r 11 (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, iJ 28,
104 P.3d 1208). Illegality may also result if the statute or ordinance at issue is
unconstitutional. See Gillmor v. Summit County, 2010 UT 69, ,r 29,246 P.3d 102.
When it filed its petition for review, Mike's asserted both that the City Council's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and that the decision
was illegal because the underlying statute was unconstitutional. (R. 1-8.) Yet, as this
matter has progressed, Mike's has abandoned both, treating the case as more of an
academic exercise in statutory interpretation as opposed to an appeal of a license
@

revocation in which the City Council made uncontested findings. Within the appropriate
framework, it seems that Mike's is appealing the legality of the City Council's decision.
B.

The City Council's findings stand because Mike's has failed to
properly challenge them.

Mike's has not only abandoned a substantial evidence challenge, it has also
abandoned and waived any challenge to the City Council's factual findings. Instead, it
merely drops a footnote in its brief conceding the facts related to "the possession and sale
of Reborn," but professing "disagree[ment] with any statement of fact concluding Reborn
@

contained a controlled substance or controlled substance analog or that Mike's knew or
intended the product to be a controlled substances analog." (Br. 2 n.2.) That
"disagreement" is wholly insufficient for Mike's to properly discharge its burden on
appeal.

A party challenging fact findings has a duty to marshal the evidence and
demonstrate that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. See Carlsen v.
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Board ofAdjustment, 2012 UT App 260, iI 7,287 P.3d 440 (reasoning that an appealing
party cannot demonstrate lack of substantial evidence in the record by focusing on
"selected facts that support his position and simply ignor[ing] contradictory facts that
support the Board's decision"). Mike's has made no effort to meet this burden. Nor
could it. It conceded below that the findings were not in dispute. (R. 322 & 509 - Hr'g

Tr. 29:13-15, 30:1-10.) 11
By failing to challenge the findings at any level, and refusing to marshal the
evidence in its opening brief, Mike's has waived any substantial evidence challenge to
the City Council's decision. See Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746,
7 51 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Generaliy, where an appellant fails to brief an issue on
appeal, the point is waived."); Carlsen, 2012 UT App 260, iI 7 ("By failing to address the
evidence that supports the Board's decision, [appellant] has failed to marshal the
evidence; by not marshaling the evidence, [appellant] has failed to bear his burden to
show that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence.").
In sum, the only question Mike's has raised for the Court on appeal-albeit
impliedly-is the claimed illegality of the City Council's interpretation of the controlled
substance analog definition. But in reviewing that question, the City Council's
interpretation, which was fully informed by its undisputed factual findings, is entitled to
deference. See Fox, 2008 UT 85, iI 11.
11

Mike's asserted, "In the present case the parties are not disputing most of the
factual determinations of the City." (R. 322; Pet'r Br. at 6.) As it sole "dispute," it
criticized the City Council's determination to side with the State Crime Lab over Mike's
generic and W1Swom opinion letters. (Id.) It does not advance that argument on appeal.
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©

II.

The City's Statutory Interpretation was in all Respects Correct, Consistent
with Legislative Intent, and Followed Established Rules of Statutory
Construction.
Mike's presents what it calls a single question of statutory interpretation: Whether

the definition of a controlled substance analog in Utah Code section 58-37-2(l)(g) should
be read conjunctively or disjunctively. (Br. 1, 5.) It contends the Court must read the
statute conjunctively in order to avoid "absurd results and valid constitutional
challenges." (Br. 5.) To set up its analysis, Mike's spends the first nearly seven pages of
its argument laying the Utah and federal drug analog definitions side~by-side and
claiming that because they are similar and were intended to address the same evil, this
Court must blindly follow various federal court interpretations of the federal statute when
interpreting Utah's statute. (Br. 5-11.) That is not so.
Interpretation of a Utah statute does not begin with an analysis of federal law. It
begins with the actual language of the Utah statute and an effort to determine the intent of
@

the Utah Legislature. "It is well settled that when faced with a question of statutory
interpretation, 'our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the
Legislature."' Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ,r 14,267 P.3d
863 (quoting Salt Lake County v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, ,r 27,234 P.3d 1105).
"'The best evidence of the legislature's intent is 'the plain language of the statute itself."'
Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, 1 18, 193 P.3d 92).
To that end, we assume "'that the legislature used each term advisedly according

@

to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning."' Id. (quoting Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., 2009
UT 69, ,r 32, 219 P.3d 918). We also assume that the expression of one term means the
21
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Legislature intended to exclude another term. Id. Moreover, courts must avoid any
interpretation that renders any parts or words of a statute "inoperative or superfluous."

State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ,r 11, 31 P.3d 547.
Here, the Legislature amended Utah Code section 58-37-2(1)(g)(i) to redefine
controlled substance analogs. That amendment had a singular purpose: To combat the
underground chemists driving Utahns to emergency rooms and worse, by manufacturing
drug analogs that were a step ahead of statutory definitions. Under the amended statute,
'"Controlled substance analog' means:
(A) a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to
the chemical structure of a [listed] controlled substance ... ;
(B) a substance which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of [listed]
controlled substances ... ; or

(C) A substance which, with respect to a particular individual, is
represented or intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of [listed]
controlled substances ... "
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2(1)(g)(i).
Use of the disjunctive "or" between enumerated subsections in a statute "clearly
mandates" that only one of the subsections need be satisfied, not all. Calhoun v. State

Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56, ,r 20, 96 P.2d 916. The term "or" creates alternatives
in a list as opposed to combing items in the list. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Gamer,

Reading Law: The Interpretation ofLegal Texts 116 (2012). That has long been the
established meaning of the connector "or" under Utah's rules of statutory interpretation:
"The words being used in series, the only connective being the disjunctive 'or,' it applies
22
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to the whole series. Therefore the ordinary and usual meaning of the language would be
that the subject is deemed to give his consent to a test of some one of the designated
substances, or of another, but not all of them." Ringwood v. State, 333 P.2d 943, 944
(Utah 1959).
By its plain language, under section 58-37-2{l)(g)(i), a substance need only have
one of three things to qualify as a controlled substance analog: (A) a substantially similar
chemical structure as a listed controlled substance; (B) a substantially similar effect as a
listed controlled substance; or (C) is represented as having such an effect. See Utah Code
~

Ann.§ 58-37-2(1)(g)(i).
The 2012 amendments reinforce this plain language interpretation. With those
amendments, the Legislature moved the predicate showing in the opening clause

~

(substantially similar chemical structure) to a subordinate subsection, equal to what was
previously two subordinate subsections, and left the disjunctive "or" between them. See
2012 Utah Laws Chap. 297 (codified as Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2(l)(g)(i) {LexisNexis
2012)). We cannot ignore these structural changes. See, e.g., T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah

State Tax Comm 'n, 2011 UT 28, ,r 27,254 P.3d 752 ("As part of our plain language
analysis, we place significance on the removal of a term from a piece of legislation.").
By placing the colon directly after the introductory clause-"'Controlled

substance analog' means:"-and using semi-colons to set off the list that follows, the
Legislature had one thing in mind: create alternative stand-alones between the three
~

subsections that follow. "Where the opening clause of a statutory section ends with a
colon, the further use of semicolons to set off sub-sections suggests that the subsections
23
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are closely related to the opening clause and that the sub-sections comprise the list of
items of equal or similar importance." lA Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 21 :15 (7th
ed. West 2012). A before and after look at the statute demonstrates the significance of
the change in text and structure:
Pre-2012

(1 )(g)(i) "Controlled substance analog"
means a substance the chemical structure
of which is substantially similar to ... :

2012 Amendment

(l)(g)(i) "Controlled substance analog"
means:
(A) a substance the chemical
structure of which is substantially
similar to ...

(A) which has a stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect ...
substantially similar to ... ; or

(B) a substance which has a ... ; or

(B) which, with respect to a
particular individual, is represented or
intended ...

(C) A substance which, with respect
to a particular individual, is
represented or intended ...

This was no accident. By breaking it out like this, the Legislature jettisoned the
predicate requirement plus (A) or (B) and created three stand alones: (A), (B), or (C).
Thus, taking all things into account-the changes to the text, structure, and
punctuation; the overriding goals the Legislature was seeking to achieve; and most
importantly the plain language of the statute itself-there is one correct way to interpret
the statute: exactly as the City Council (and district court) did. By the statute's plain
language, a controlled substance analog is a substance that has one of the following
characteristics: (A) a substantially similar chemical structure as a listed controlled
substance, (B) substantially similar chemical effects as a listed controlled substance, or
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(C) is represented as having substantially similar chemical effects as a listed controlled
®

substance. See Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2(l)(g)(i).

III. The Absurd Results and Constitutional Avoidance Canons Do Not
Authorize Judicial Revisions to Unambiguous Statutes.
Significantly, Mike's agrees that the Legislature's intent is precisely what the City
Council said it was, which is exactly how the statute reads: disjunctively. (R. 327.) It
conceded the point below: "Let it be said at the outset that [Mike's] has never argued that
the legislature ever intended anything other than precisely what the City claims it meant.
There is no question the legislature intended for the amended UCA § 58-37-2(g) to be
read in the disjunctive." (R 327, Pet'r Dist. Ct. Br. at 11.) Seizing on this concession, the
district court noted, "[Mike's] actually goes as far as to affirmatively endorse this
@

[disjunctive] interpretation ... " (R. 629; Dist. Ct. Ruling at 6 n.l.)
Still, Mike's argues that the Court must read subsection (A) conjunctively with
either subsection (B) or (C). This is so, Mike's contends, based of two seldom-used tools
of statutory interpretation: the absurd results and constitutional avoidance canons. (Br.
5.) So even as it concedes the City Council's interpretation was consistent with

@

legislative intent, Mike's argues that the Court is duty bound to save the Legislature from
itself and interpret the statute as though the Legislature never touched it in 2012, lest it
result in absurdities or suffer an unconstitutional fate. (Br. 11-23.)
That assertion is erroneous for several reasons. First, it rests entirely on federal
cases that were decided by ambiguities in the federal statute that are not present in Utah's
statute. Second, as a threshold matter, the absurd results and constitutional avoidance
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canons do not apply in the absence of ambiguity. And third, the judiciary cannot employ
either canon to rewrite statutory text in a manner contrary to legislative intent. To hold

®

otherwise would result in judicial usurpation of the lawmaking authority that only the
people's elected representatives may exercise.
@

A.

The federal conjunctive interpretation was based on ambiguous
language in the federal statute that is not present in the Utah statute.

The centerpiece of Mike's argument is a pair of federal cases, United States v.

Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429 (3d Cir.
2003). (Br. 11-12.) The federal courts in both cases interpreted the federal drug analog
definition conjunctively. But as the district court aptly explained below, the reasons for
the conjunctive reading of the federal statute are based on differences, not similarities in
the federal and state statutes. (R. 629-634; Dist. Ct. Ruling at 6-11.)
In both Turcotte and Hodge, the courts ended at the conjunctive interpretation that
Mike's advances here, only after laboring to find the federal drug analog definition
ambiguous. See Turcotte, 405 F .3d at 521; Hodge, 321 F .3d at 436. Both courts
concluded that clause (i) in the federal statute could be read as stating an independent
requirement, whereas clauses (ii) and (iii) appeared subordinate to (i), because the
"functional language in each,"-the term "which"-more naturally referred back to (i) as
opposed to the opening clause. See Hodge, 321 F .3d at 436; Turcotte, 405 F .3d at 522.
As best explained in Hodge, this "suggests that clauses (ii) and (iii) more likely modify
clause (i)'s phrase 'controlled substance in schedule I or II' than the word 'substance' in
the main clause." Hodge, 321 F.3d at 436. Thus, in both Turcotte and Hodge, the courts
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concluded that the qualifying language "which" at the beginning of clauses (ii) and (iii)
<i

of the federal statute resulted in two equally plausible interpretations of a controlled
substance analog: one conjunctive, one disjunctive.
Not so in the corresponding provisions in Utah Code section 58-37-2(l)(g)(i).
Subsections (B) and (C) in the state statute begin, not with the word "which," but with the
phrase "a substance which." Utah Code§ 58-37-2{l)(g)(i)(B), (C). As the district court
explained, this difference "yields a different conclusion." (R. 633; Dist. Ct. Ruling at
10.) It reinforces the legislative intent evident in the statute's plain language that, unlike

<i>

the federal statute, each of the subdivisions in the state statute "is intended to stand on its
own rather than modifying subdivision (A)." (R. 633; Dist. Ct. Ruling at 10.) When
viewed side-by-side, the differences become apparent:
28 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)

Utah Code§ 58-37-2(1)(g)(i)

"Controlled substance analog" means:
(A) la substance the chemical
structure of fwhich is substantially
similar ...

[T]he term "controlled substance
analogue" means ~ substance~(i) lthe chemical structure of whic~ is
substantially similar ...
(ii) ~ has a stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect ... ;
or

(B) la substance whicij has a ... ; or
(C) IA substance whichJ, with respect
to a particular individual, is
represented or intended ...

(iii) with respect to a particular
person,~ such person represents
or intends ...

Unlike the federal analog definition in which two plausible interpretations result
@

from the wording of clause (i) in relation to (ii) and (iii) and the remoteness of (ii) and
(iii) from the term "substance" in the opening clause, the wording of ~ach subsection of
27
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Utah's statute begins with "a substance which," and thus all stand alone. The ambiguity
in the federal statute made it possible for the courts in Turcotte and Hodge to employ a
conjunctive reading. That same ambiguity is not present in Utah's statute and therefore
does not plausibly allow a similar conjunctive reading.
That is not all. The Hodge court went further in its analysis to get to a conjunctive
reading, relying on Congress's successive use of the term "or" after every subordinate
clause when defining another term in the same section of the federal controlled

@

substances law. That resulted in ambiguities not present in the state counterpart. The

Hodge court explained that in the overall context of the federal drug analog statute, the
proposition that "'or' between two words" means they can each stand alone (i.e., are
disjunctive) is not always the case because "even within [28 U.S.C.] § 802, Congress did
not always consider a single 'or' between the final terms of a series sufficient evidence of
disjunctive intent." Id. at 436. Rather, when defining a "depressant or stimulant
substance" in[§] 802(9), Congress inserted an "or" after each clause. Hodge, 321 F.3d at
436. Thus, the court reasoned, "where 'or' is absent between clauses (i) and (ii) [in§
802(32)(A),] but present between (ii) and (iii), we do not find conclusive evidence for a
disjunctive reading." Id.
By comparison, successive use of the term "or" is "conspicuously absent" in
defining the same term in the Utah statute. (R. 631; Dist. Ct. Ruling at 8.) Even though
Utah statute defines "depressant or stimulant substance" by tracking the language of the
federal definition nearly verbatim, it omits the successive use of the term "or" after the
provisions corresponding with subdivisions (A) and (B) in the federal definition.
28
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Compare Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2(1)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) with 21 U.S.C. § 802(9)
@

(comparison reproduced at Addendum 4).
These distinctions may seem minor at first glance. But they paved the way for the
conjunctive reading in Turcotte and Hodge. And with all the similarities between the
state and federal statutes, these key terms are not among them. So even as Mike's uses
the similarities between the statutes to push its conjunctive interpretation, even
suggesting (at 7-9) that Utah may have copied the federal statute, the material differences
that Mike's refuses to acknowledge do not mandate an interpretive departure from the

@

plain language of Utah's statute. See, e.g., Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,
679 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1984) ("[W]hen the Legislature adopts a statute from another
state, the presumption is that the Legislature is familiar with that state's judicial
interpretations of that statute and intends to adopt them also ... " but that canon "is not
applicable where there have been material changes made in the second statute."). 12
When we consider these differences in light of established rules of statutory
construction, along with the unmistakable differences between the 2011 and 2012
versions of Utah Code section 58-37-2(l)(g)(i), we are left with a single, plausible
conclusion: section 58-37-2(l)(g)(i) does not suffer from the same ambiguities as the
federal statute. And without the same ambiguity, there is no opportunity to go beyond
the plain language under either the absurd results or constitutional avoidance canons. See
12

Utah's "controlled substances analog" definition contains other differences. For
example, Utah's definition expressly excludes various "dietary supplements, vitamins,
minerals, herbs or other similar substances ... " Utah Code Ann. § 58-3 7-2(g)(ii)(F). The
federal statute does not. See 28 U.S.C. § 802(32)(C).
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Marion Energy, Inc., 2011 UT 50, 1125-26 (explaining that absurdity canon is only
employed if statute is ambiguous); Utah Dep 't of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, 112425, 332 P.3d 900 (explaining that constitutional avoidance canon is only employed if
statute is ambiguous).

B.

Hypothetical absurd results provide no basis for judicial revisions to
unambiguous statutes.

Instead of addressing these differences, Mike's plods down the federal path and
asserts that each subsection of 58-37-2(1)(g)(i), standing alone, would lead to absurd
results. (Br. 12-19.) This, Mike's proclaims,justifies a judicial rewrite. That argument
cannot stand.
For starters, as just explained, the canon is only employed after statutory language
proves ambiguous because it yields two plausible interpretations. See Marion Energy,

Inc., 2011 UT 50, 1125-26. In that circumstance, the court opts for the alternative that
avoids the absurd results. See id. 1 26._ This is so, because when given two plausible
readings of statutory text, the court assumes the legislature could not have intended the
one resulting in an absurdity. See id.
As explained at length above, there is no ambiguity in section 58-37-2(1)(g)(i).
And there is no indication that the Legislature did not intend each subsection to stand on
its own. In fact, as Mike's concedes, the opposite is true. Indeed, the statutory
amendments at issue were adopted in 2012, after federal courts like Turcotte and Hodge
had grappled with the c01;1junctive/disjunctive interpretation of the federal analog
definition. If anything, the Legislature ensured that the terminology which created the
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ambiguities in the federal analog statute did not make it into Utah's version, thereby
ii}

removing any doubt.
The canon to interpret statutes in order to avoid absurd results does not allow the
judiciary to wield a legislative pen to rewrite an unambiguous statute in a manner that is
contrary to Legislative intent. Nor does it give the judiciary a veto power over statutory
amendments through force of interpretation. That is the result Mike's seeks, as it would
effectively roll the statute back to its pre-amendment form, as if the Legislature never
touched it in 2012. The request goes too far. The judiciary does not determine "what the

@

law ought to be." Hanchett v. Burbidge, 202 P. 377,380 (Utah 1921). The judiciary is
"guided by the law as it is." Id. It therefore "cannot by construction liberalize the statute
and enlarge its provisions. When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to
mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." /d. 13

C.

The constitutional avoidance canon is not a license to rewrite
legislation.

The same is true with the second canon Mike's invokes, the canon of
constitutional avoidance. Again, our supreme court has explained that, "for the
@

constitutional avoidance canon to even apply, 'the statute must be genuinely susceptible
to two constructions"-a determination that is made 'after, and not before, its
complexities are unraveled."' Utah Dep 't ofTransp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ,i,i 24-25,

13

Any question about whether the Legislature imagined the absurd results that could
follow is answered by the scienter requirement in section 58-37-8(1). See infra Point
IV.A at 33.
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332 P.3d 900 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,238 (1998)).
As explained above, it is not.
What's more, "the avoidance canon is not a license to rewrite statutes. It is a tool
for interpreting them." Orlando Millenia, LC v. United Title Servs. of Utah, Inc., 2015
UT 55, il 84, 355 P.3d 965. So even though, as a general proposition, courts should
"whenever possible, construe a statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities,"
there are limitations on its right to do so. LML. v. State, 2002 UT 110, il 25, 61 P.3d
103 8. The primary limitation is the rules of statutory interpretation. See id. (explaining
that even on constitutional questions courts are "limited" in construing statutes "by
reasonable canons of statutory construction"). When interpreting the constitutionality of
statutes, '"we will not "infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there.
Rather; the interpretation must be based on the language used, and [we have] no power to
rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed.''" Id. (quoting Assoc. Gen.

Contrs. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, il 30, 38 P.3d 291) (quoting Berrett v.
Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367,370 (Utah 1994)). In other words, even when courts
endeavor to construe a statute to avoid unconstitutionality, they must do so consistent
with established rules of statutory interpretation. See State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ,I
12, 31 P.3d 547 (reasoning that statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad after
applying required "principles of statutory construction").
Mike's concedes that it seeks an interpretation of section 58-37-2(1)(g)(i) that is at
odds with its plain language and the legislative intent. Still, it asks this Court to insert a
qualifier-to supply the missing "and" after subsection (A) in order to avoid
32
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"constitutional challenges." That is not something the courts can do. "[T]he mere
~

existence of such questions does not give us license to add a qualifier or limitation not
evident on the face of the statute." Orlando Millenia, LC, 2015 UT 55, iJ 84. Indeed,
"the Due Process _Clause is not a license for judicial second-guessing of legislative policy
judgments." Id. ,I 85. To hold otherwise would constitute a usurpation oflegislative
power.

***
The touchstone for statutory interpretation is legislative intent. Savage v. Utah
@

Youth Viii., 2004 UT 102, iJ 18, 104 PJd 1242. That intent is evident in section 58-37-

2(1)(g)(i)'s plain language; confirmed by its legislative history; and suffers no ambiguity
allowing a contrary interpretation.

IV. The Facts Establish that Mike's Knowingly and Intentionally Violated
Utah's Controlled Substance Laws.
\

A.

The scienter requirement prevents absurdities and limits governmental
overreach.

To be sure, Mike's has imagined (at 12-17) some remote and entirely unintended
consequences of applying the three subsections as the Legislature wrote them. The court
in United States v. Vickery, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2002), pointed out the
potential absurdities that could result if each federal subsection is read alone without the
predicate qualifier in the first federal subsection. See id. at 13 69. Imagine a drug task
force raiding the comer market and bagging energy drinks and Doritos as evidence while
hauling the unsuspecting shopkeeper down to the station to book on drug charges. But
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we can only imagine, because we are not aware of any case in Utah where this has
happened, and certainly not in the four years since the Legislature amended the statute.
Moreover, Mike's is not the unsuspecting storekeeper. It seeks to have the Court
interpret a statutory definition in the abstract, without reference to its own conduct. But
no matter how many scenarios it spins to demonstrate the supposed absurdity of reading
each subsection by itself, this case is about the facts. Uncontested facts. And those facts
close the gap between any "absurdity" or "constitutional issues" between the controlled

@

substance analog definition and the reason the City revoked Mike's business license:
There was substantial evidence to show that Mike's lmowingly and intentionally
possessed a controlled substance with the intent to distribute in violation of Utah law.

See Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-8(1) (LexisNexis 2012). That finding was confirmed when
Best pleaded no contest to the underlying criminal charges.
The controlled substance analog definition criminalizes nothing. It is definitional,
and merely brings certain analogs within the definition of "controlled substances." Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-2(f)(i)(C). The definition has little meaning without reference to the
lmowing and intentional requirement found in Utah Code section 58-37-8(1). See Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (LexisNexis 2012). This analysis is reflected in the recent case

McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015), wherein the United States Supreme
Court addressed the mental state required to prove a defendant knowingly manufactured,
possessed, or distributed a controlled substance analog. See id. at 2305. It held that "the
Government must prove that a defendant knew that the substance with which he was
dealing was 'a controlled substance,' even in prosecutions involving an analogue." Id.
34
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This knowledge can be established with evidence showing the defendant (1) knew he was
@

dealing with a controlled substance even ifhe didn't know its particular identity; or (2)
establishing that the defendant knew that he was dealing with a specific analogue by
showing that he has knowledg~ that the substance possesses any of the features in the
controlled substance analog definition. See id. 14
Importantly here, in response to the defendant's "cqnstitutional avoidance"
argument, the Court explained that " [u ]nder our precedents, a scienter requirement in a
statute 'alleviate[s] vagueness concerns,' 'narrow[s] the scope of the [its] prohibition[,]

@

and limit[s] prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 2307 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 149, 150 (2007)) (alterations original). 15 The scienter requirement in section 58-378( 1) limits its application to those who "knowingly and intentionally'' possess and
distribute a controlled substance. It protects the class of unsuspecting people that Mike's
attempts to hide behind in an effort to cover its criminal enterprise. The scienter

@

requirement ensures an individual understands the facts which fit the elements of the
prohibited conduct. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952)

14

In McFadden, the Court noted that it was not addressing the conjunctive/
disjunctive debate surrounding 28 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A), because the government had
simply assumed that it was conjunctive. See McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2305 n.3. The
question, so far as the federal statute is concerned, thus remains unresolved. Id.
15

Chief Justice Roberts put it more bluntly in concurrence, stating that where the
statute expressly includes a "knowing" requirement as part of the offense, "a person's
lack of knowledge regarding the legal element can be a defense." McFadden, 135 S. Ct.
at 2308 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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(explaining that the scienter requirement causes a convergence of an "evil-meaning mind
with an evil-doing hand").

B.

When facts are applied, any potential constitutional infirmities
disappear.

The facts place still another barrier in front Mike's. Though it presents this appeal
as an issue of pure statutory interpretation, professing that it is not really a vagueness
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, 16 Mike's is trying to achieve the same
result without having to clear the same constitutional hurdles. It asks this Court to
rewrite legislation to avoid hypothetical constitutional concerns, because it knows that it
cannot meet a vagueness challenge head on. Though it urges the Court to read the statute
conjunctively in order to avoid "valid constitutional challenges" (Br. 5), it refuses to
follow through on its own challenge, even as it relies on cases that were vagueness
challenges. See U.S. v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2002) (addressing vagueness
challenge); U.S. v. Roberts, 2002 WL 31014834 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2002) (addressing
vagueness challenge), vacated, 363 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2004).
But a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute cannot brush off the facts
as applied to its conduct; it must confront them head on. See State v. Ansari, 2004 UT
App 326, ,I 27, 100 P.3d 231 (explaining that a party lacks standing to challenge a statute
on vagueness grounds if statute is not vague as as-applied to that party). It must prove
16

Even after staking out constitutional ground in its petition for review, Mike's made
the same assertion below: "While discussing vagueness it must be made clear that
[Mike's] petition for judicial review is not necessarily tantamount to a challenge on the
constitutionality of UCA § 58-37-2(g). The question is not its constitutionality but rather
its proper interpretation." (R. 332, Pet'r Dist. Ct. Br. 16.)
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unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt," and against a presumption of
~

constitutionality. State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, ,r 21, 975 P.2d 489 (citing State v.
Tritt, 463 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1970)).
A vagueness challenge to a statute may be raised on two fronts: ( 1) a facial
challenge-i.e., the statute is unconstitutional on its face; or (2) an as~applied
challenge-i.e., the statute is "unconstitutional as applied to the facts of a given case."
State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, ,r 14, 220 P.3d 136. The as-applied concept is
conspicuously absent from Mike's brief. But the veiled facial challenge is front and

@

center.
A facial challenge seeks to vindicate not only the rights of the challenger but also
the rights of "'others who may be adversely impacted by the statute in question."'
Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, ,r 14 (quoting State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ,r 27, 100 P.3d
231 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1999))). When asserting a

@

facial challenge, the party must demonstrate that the statute at issue "' is so
constitutionally flawed that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute]
would be valid."' Id. (quoting Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, iI 27). This is particularly true
"[w]here, as here, a statute 'implicates no constitutionally protected conduct,"' 17 in which
case "'a court will uphold a facial vagueness challenge "only if the [statute] is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications."' State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ,r 12, 84

17

Such as regulation of free speech or association. See Village ofHoffman Estates,
455 U.S. at 499.
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P.3d 1171 (quoting Village ofHoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)). This is Mike's unsuspecting storekeeper argument.
Conversely, "' [w]hen asserting an as-applied challenge, the party claims that,
under the facts of his particular case, the statute was applied ... in an unconstitutional
manner."' Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, 114 (quoting Ansari, 2004 UT App 326,127). Thus,
if an as-applied challenge fails, then the facial challenge also fails because there is a set
of circumstances under which the statute is valid. See id. (stating that "if a 'statute ... is
clear as applied to a particular complainant [it] cannot be considered impennissibly vague
in all of its applications and thus will necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge"')
(quoting State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ,I 12, 84 P.3d 1171).
Because "'[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others,"' the
court should '"examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical
applications of the law."' Greenwood v. City ofNorth Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820
(Utah 1991) (quoting Village ofHoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982)). Here, that analysis forecloses Mike's claim that the City
"interpreted" the statute in an unconstitutional manner in upholding the business license
revocation.
This is not a case about the general public not knowing what the law is. It is not
about various hypotheticals that pose the question of whether caffeine, ginseng, flour,
Doritos, or energy drinks fall within what the statute proscribes. Vagueness does not rise
or fall on the basis of hypotheticals because anyone can "proffer hypertechnical theories
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as to what the statute covers." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) (explaining
~

that there is "little doubt that imagination can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the
meaning of these terms will be in nice question") (citation omitted)). When there are
facts to apply, the hypotheticals are meaningless, no matter how absurd they can be spun:
Where there is "no uncertainty regarding the statute's proscription of [the defendants']
conduct, we refuse their invitation to conjure conditions under which the statute could be
vague." Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, ,r 45.
The unchallenged and undisputed facts establish the following:
•

As part of a lengthy drug task force investigation, the State Crime Lab actually
tested Mike's Reborn on three different occasions-each time confirming that
these products contained XLRl 1, which is an analog of the listed controlled
substance AM-694.

•

Mike's did not dispute the fact that the product that it sold or possessed with intent
to distribute contained XLR 11.

•

Mike's hid its Reborn out of public view, in the safety of a backroom, believing
that it was illegal to display it.

•

Mike's admittedly labeled its product "Reborn" or "aroma therapy" as a
camouflage to intentionally fool law enforcement investigations.

•

Although it treated its "Reborn" product differently from other products in its store
by presenting various obstacles to its purchase-hiding it from public view and
requiring customers to ask for it by name-the product nevertheless generated
approximately 40% of Mike's daily sales.

•

Mike's only sold the Reborn to people over 19-years old and knew exactly what
people were doing it with: Smoking it as they would marijuana. In fact, Mike's
employees told people if they smoked it they would go to jail.

•

Mike's put special safeguards on the product because people were stealing it-and
had even burglarized the store to get their hands on it.
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•

Mike's bought its product from a person known only by first name only, from a
company known only by an acronym-"GOS"-and obtained lab reports from a
testing company for a business listed by another acronym-"DVS"-which had a
fake St. George business address and no business license to operate in St. George.

•

Apparently concerned enough about their activities, Mike's consulted with its
attorney on the statute.
This is ample evidence-indeed substantial evidence-from which the City

Council could reasonably conclude, as it did, that Mike's was using its business premises
@

to traffic in a controlled substance in violation of Utah law. Thus, the City was entitled to
revoke its business license. See 14th St. Gym, Inc., 2008 UT App 127, ,r 10. That is,
after all, what this case is about.
Mike's Orwellian concerns (at 17) about who is going to stop government from
prosecuting the unwary is not enough to overcome facts. 18 Moreover, this case is not a
criminal prosecution at all. All of the cases on which Mike's relies were appeals in
criminal prosecutions. This case is a business licensing matter. There is a distinction. In
the context of this case, the drug analog statute is part of a municipal licensing issue; a
business regulation. The distinction is important, not only as it relates to the standard of
review-giving deference to a regulatory decision versus prison time-but as it relates to
the degree of vagueness the constitution will tolerate.
18

In any event, the Due Process Clause will apply differently to the unwary
shopkeeper selling common products and not engaging in conduct with all the hallmarks
of a drug trafficking operation. As with most cases, facts make all the difference in how
the law is applied. See Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ,r 14 (explaining that where statute is
"sufficiently clear to convey warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices[, t]he Constitution requires no more") (citations
omitted). This is why a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must confront
the facts as-applied to that party.
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"The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates-as well as the relative
Ce

importance of fair notice and fair enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the
enactment." Village ofHoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
498 (1982). This is "because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior
carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the
regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its
own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process." Id. See also State v. Green, 2004
UT 76, ,r 43, 99 P.3d 820 ("The constitution tolerates a greater degree of vagueness in

~

civil statutes than in criminal statutes.") (citing Village ofHoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at
498-99). Through this lens, Mike's arguments carry little objective force.
Mike's understood that its actions were prohibited by the statute. It went out of its
way to conceal those activities. Further, as the Supreme Court said businesses would
likely do, Mike's consulted with its attorneys in advance about the law. Mike's intent is
in plain view: Get as close as it can to the line. But "'one who deliberately goes
perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the
line."' State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ,J 15, 31 P.3d 547 (quoting St(!,te v. Jordan, 665
P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1983) (quoting Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,
340 (1952)).
Mike's knowingly took the risk. And having done so, it cannot now complain that
it should be spared because of the potential absurd results that may befall others. Rather,
Mike's own conduct demonstrates that it was reasonably certain as to the meaning of the
drug analog statute to understand its conduct fell within what the statute proscribes. That
41
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is enough. See Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ,I 15 ("Words are symbols of communication and
as such are not invested with the quality of a scientific formula. It is enough that they can
be construed with reasonable certainty.") (citations omitted). No more is required. See

***
In sum, as applied to this case, Utah Code section 58-37-2(1)(g)(i) suffers from no
constitutional infirmities that would justify adopting Mike's proposed interpretation. As
the district court held, the City Council's interpretation was in all respects correct. This
Court should affirm.

V.

@

Even Under a Conjunctive Reading, the Court Should Affirm Because
Reborn Still Qualifies as a Controlled Substance Analog.
Finally, if the Court harbors any doubts about the Legislative intent and how to

read the controlled substance analog definition (and it should not), it should still affirm
under the facts of this case. Though Mike's asks (at 25-26) the Court to reverse and
remand for the City Council to apply a conjunctive reading of the statute, Mike's failure
to challenge the City Council's fact findings is fatal, because those findings show that
subsections (A) and (C) were satisfied. Thus, the Court should affirm even if it
concludes that the conjunctive reading is the correct reading. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002
UT 58, ,I 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (reiterating that it is "well settled" that an appellate court may
affirm on any ground).
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A.

XLR-11 has a substantially similar chemical structure to the listed
controlled substance, AM-694.

First, the City Council found that XLR-11 is a substance with a substantially
similar chemical structure to the listed controlled substance AM-694. (R. 47.) That
@

finding is uncontested on appeal. As the district court concluded, it was based on
substantial evidence in the record in the form of the reports generated from actual testing
conducted by the state crime lab. The City Council, as the fact finder, was free to review
the expert opinions-the State Crime Lab on the one hand, and Mike's "experts" on the
other-and make a determination as to which, if any, it would accept and how much
weight it would assign to each. See Carlsen, 2012 UT App 260, ,r 8 (explaining that
court will not substitute its judgment for administrative fact finder's determination

~

between two conflicting views). That is what it did, and it was not simply flipping a coin.
The City Council made findings and explained its reasoning. Mainly, that the credentials
and experience of the State Crime Lab and the forensic scientist who conducted the tests,
Lamoreaux, were unquestioned. (R. 44 ,r 5.) That courts around the state had accepted
Lamoreaux's expertise and opinions in the area. (R. 44.) And, significantly, that

@

Lamoreaux actually examined the samples from Mike's on three different occasions and
found that the samples contained XLRI 1, a structural analog of AM-694. (R. 44 ,r 5.)
As for Mike's experts-the written statements from De Jesus and McDougal-the
the City Council found that De Jesus' s opinion letter referred to the former instead of the
current Utah drug analog statute and that McDougal' s opinion letter did not address Utah
law at all. (R. 44 ,r 6.) Instead, McDougal discussed the structural compound of AM-694
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and XLRl l and the chemical effects of the substance. (R. 44 ,I 6.) And, significantly,
neither De Jesus nor McDougal actually tested or analyzed the products. They merely
stated that in their opinion XLRl 1 should not be considered an analog of AM-694. (R.
44 ,I 6.)
Ultimately, the City Council concluded that "the evidence provided by the State
Crime Lab and Mr. Lamoreaux is credible and reliable." (R. 47,I 3.) As such, it
concluded that "[i]t is reasonable to rely on the determination made by the State Lab that
the product sold or possessed by Mike's Smoke Shop with the intent to distribute,
contained XLRl 1 which has a chemical structure substantially similar to the chemical
structure of the listed controlled substance AM-694 and that the chemical had a common
core structure with a single point of divergence." (R. 47 ,I 3.) As the record
demonstrates, the City Council's decision was based on a close examination of the
reports and writings, most significantly the fact that the state crime lab actually tested the
product; Mike's experts did not. The City Council was also able to look at the diagrams
and compare the structure ofXLRl 1 and AM-694 and see for themselves the substantial
similarities in the two. (R. 640; 253, 257.) What's more, the record shows that of the
reports submitted, Lamoreaux's was the only one signed and verified under criminal
penalty. The DeJesus letter bears no signature at all.
There was nothing arbitrary about the City Council's conclusion. This is
particularly true when considered in light of all of the surrounding evidence in the case:
from the drug task force investigation; to the criminal charges and no contest plea; to the
re-labeling of product to fool law enforcement. These· surrounding facts clinch the
44
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findings. Indeed, a reasonable person could conclude that if Mike's experts were correct,
@

then Mike's had no reason to engage in any of the irregular and clandestine activities
which surrounded its purchase and sale of Reborn and "aroma therapy'' products. See

State in re KC., 2013 UT App 201, ,r 13,309 P.3d 255 (explaining that courts,juries, and
administrative fact finders are never bound to accept any expert's opinions but are '"free
to judge the expert testimony as to its credibility and its persuasive influence in light of
all of the other evidence in the case"') (quoting State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,I 200,299
P.3d 892).
The first element in section 58-37-2(l)(g)(i) is therefore met: XLR-11 has a
substantially similar to the chemical structure of a listed controlled substance. See Utah
Code§ 58-37-2(l)(g)(i)(A).

B.

The evidence shows that the Reborn (XLR-11) was represented or
intended as having a substantially similar effect as a listed controlled
substance.

Subsection (C) is also satisfied. This subsection requires a showing that the
substance is "represented or intended to have" a substantially similar effect as a listed
controlled substance. Utah Code§ 58-37-2(l)(g)(i)(C). Once again, those same
surrounding facts, as found by the City Council and undisputed on appeal, confirm
Mike's represented and intended Reborn to have substantially similar chemical effects as
a listed controlled substance.
The City Council included as a finding-unchallenged on appeal-that "based on
~

the totality of the facts, there is substantial evidence that Mike's Smoke Shop, its owner
and employees, had the requisite knowledge and intent to commit a violation of the law
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by distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute, analogs of an illegal substance.
(R. 48.) This evidence," the City Council continued, "goes far beyond what is required
for a business license revocation, but is demonstrative of the weight of the evidence
supporting the decision to revoke Mike's Smoke Shop's business license." (R. 48.) It
was reasonable for the City Council to infer, based on the uncontested facts-which
included the criminal charges against Best-that Mike's both represented and intended its
Reborn to have substantially similar chemical effects as a listed controlled substance. Its
conduct bears all the hallmarks of a drug trafficking operation.
C.

Mike's experts opined of the substantially similar chemical effects.

Finally, there was also evidence of substantially similar chemical effects described
in subsection (B). See Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2(1)(g)(i)(B). Mike's own experts
delivered that evidence in their opinion letters. DeJesus opined that XLR-11 had
"hallucinogenic effects." (R. 250.) McDougal opined that XLR-11 had less detrimental
effects, but would go no further than that, indicating that it should "be considered on an
individual basis." (R. 252.)
When these statements are considered side-by-side with the State Crime Lab's
confirmation that the products have a substantially similar chemical structure to a listed
controlled substance and the surrounding facts referenced above, a reasonable mind could
infer that XLR-11 has substantially similar effects. In other words, using McDougal's
case-by-case approach, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the admittedly
hallucinogenic effects in Reborn were substantially similar to those of a listed controlled
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substance, AM-694. That is sufficient in the context of this business license revocation to
@

conclude that the subsection (B) is met. See 14th St. Gym, 2008 UT App 127, ,I 10.

***
In sum, even if the Court agrees with Mike's and reads the statute to require that a
substance to meet the requirements in subsections (A) plus (B) or (C), it should still
affirm as those requirements were met in this case.
CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the City Council's decision to uphold the revocation of
Mike's business license.
DATED: May 25, 2016.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

BRYAN J. PATTISON
THOMAS J. BURNS
ST. GEORGE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
SHAWN M. GUZMAN
PAULAJ.HOUSTON

Attorneys for Appellee
City ofSt. George
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SHAWN GUZMAN, # 7392
PAULA HOUSTON, # 5239
175 East200 North

St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435) 627-4000
Facsimile: (435) 627-4260
shawn.guzman@sgcity.org
paula.houston@sgcity.org

IN THE CITY COUNCIL MEETING OF THE CITY OF ST. GEORGE
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER
MIKE'S SMOKE, CIGAR & GIFTS
ADDRESS OF SUBJECT PROPERTY:
1973 W Sunset Boulevard
St. George, UT 84770

The above-entitled matter came before the St. George City Council, the appeal boar~ on
an appeal from an order of revocation for the business license for Mike,s Smoke, Cigar & Gifts
(Mike~s Smoke Shop) which is located at 1973 W. Sunset Boulevard in St George, Utah. The
City of St George (City) appeared by and through its attorney of record, Paula Houston, and
Mike•s Smoke Shop appeared by and through its attorney of record, Ryan Holdaway, on April 4,

2013 for the hearing. The City Council having heard and reviewed the proffered evidence of both
parties and being otherwise fully advised enters the following findings and order:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The City Council makes the following findings of fact:
J. Mike's Smoke Shop is located at 1973 W. Sunset BouJevard in St. George, Utah. This
business is licensed by the City to setl cigarettes, cigars, tobacco pipes, lighters, oil burners,
incens~ flavored tobacco, sports memorabilia, novelty itemst perfume and calling cards.
Christie Best and Michael Connors are the owners of the business. Kyle Bes4 the son of
owner Christie Best, is the manager of the St. George location.
2. The City business license officer sent an order of revocation to the owners of Mike?s Smoke
Shop on January 28, 2013, revoking the business license and ordering the owners to stop
conducting business in St. George. On February J, 2013, the owners filed an appeal of the
decision and requested a hearing on the revocation. The City allowed Mike,s Smoke Shop to
continue doing business during the appeal period.
1
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3. Complaints were received and a number of cases were investigated by the Washington
County Drug Task Force (Task Force) for the possible distribution of a substance commonly
known as "spice" which is regulated by the Utah Controlled Substance Act and the Imitation

@

Controlled Substance Act. In the course of these investigations, the Task Force investigated
Mike's Smoke Shop for possible violations. Employees of Mike's Smoke Shop told Task
Force officers they did not sell spice because it was illegal but they did sell products they
referred to as uaroma therapy". Undercover purch~ses of the ''aroma therapy'' products were
made at Mike's Smoke Shop by the Task .Force in March and April _of 2012. A search
warrant was obtained and executed by the Task F~rce in April 2012. During the execution of
the search warrant, a detective interviewed Kyle Best. Kyle Best told the detective that the
''aroma therapf' products had been tested and that Mike,s Smoke Shop consulted with their
attorney about the law. Kyle Best said he was familiar with the different compounds of spice.
He said he has been told to call the product "aroma therapy" and he tells customers that if
they smoke it they will go to jail. He said he only se11s it to people 19 years of age and over
and it comprises approximately 40% of their daily sales~ In July 2012 another purchase was
made by the Task Force of four niore '~aroma therapy' packets. Additional purchases were
made.by the Task Force in December 2012 and January 2013. During these transactions, the
''aroma therapy" product, which is called "Reborn", was behind the counter, out of the public
view. The packets of "Reborn" did not have barcodes like the other products in the store.
The employee scanned a sticker on the side of the cash register's monitor to enter the price of
the packet of ''Reborn" when selling it to a customer. Based on this infonnation, a search
warrant was obtained and executed by the Task Force in January 2013. M\dtiple packets of
"aroma therapy" product called "Rebom'' were seized from behind the counter, out of view
of the public, and also from a safe in the back room. During the officers' interview with
Kyle Best, when asked if it was safe to say that rio matter what name the- spice was called,
"Reborn" or "aroma therapi', it was camouflage to skirt t)le Jaw enforcement investigations,
and he said ''Yeah".

@

4. The following illegal distribution and possession with intent to distribute cases occurred at
Mike's Smoke Shop after the 2012 Utah State Legislature amended U.C.A. 58-37-2 and '5837-4.2 in HB 254 which became effective May 8, 2012:
• July 10, 2012 - Case# 12T0334 -The Utah Bureau of Forensic Services (State Crime
Lab) tested the substance and found· that Evidence 1-4 contained XLRl l, a structural

•

•

analog of AM-694 which is a listed controlled sµbstance1n U.C.A. 58-37-4.2.
January 2, 2013 - Case# 13T0001- The State Crime Lab tested the substance and found
that both packets contained XLRl l, a structural analog of AM-694 which is a listed
controlled substance in U .C.A. 58-37-4.2.
January 11, 201.3- Case# 13T000l -The State Crime Lab tested products (8 items), all
products contained XLR 11, a structural analog of AM-694 which is a listed controlled
substance in U.C.A. 58-37-4.2.
2
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5. The State Crime Lab is an accredited forensic crime lab which holds an additional

@

accreditation for forensic testing and analysis of drug chemistry including controlled
substances and general chemical testing. Terry Lamoreaux, the forensic scientist that
analyzed the products described hereint is a certified criminalist with a degree in Chemistry
and over 3.5 years of professional employment dealing with analytical chemistry and
toxicology. His extensive experience and training, as identified in his cuniculum vitae,
qualifies him as an expert in analyzing controlled substances and detennining if a substance
is an analog of a listed controlled substance. No evidence was presented by Mike's Smoke
Shop to cal.I into question the Lab's accreditations or procedures, or the skills or
qualifications of Lamoreaux. Lamoreaux has testified in numerous court proceedings and his
findings have been accepted by courts on prior cases. Lamoreaux examined the samples in
the above cases and found that the samples contained XLRl 1, a structural analog of AM-694.
XLRl 1 is an analog of AM-694 because it has a substantiaJiy similar chemical structure of
the controUed substance AM-694 due to a common core structure with a single point of
divergence. Mike's Smoke Shop did not dispute the fact that the product so1d or possessed
with intent to distribute contained XLRJ l. Identification of the chemical structure of the
substance was made solely by the State Crime Lab.
6. Mike's Smoke Shop presented statements from Karl De Jesus, Ph.D., and Owen Michael
McDougal, Ph.D., along with their curriculum vitaes. De Jesus, in his opinion letter dated
July 18, 2012, referred to the fonner instead of the current State law. The fonner law
required a showing that the substance is structurally similar to a listed controlled substance
and that the substance had "substantially similar effects on the central nervous system".
Based on the fonner law he stated the following: that XLR 11 is a synthetic cannabinoid; that
the structure was substantially different from AM-694; that the effect on the nervous system
was less potent with decreased hallucinogenic effects; and therefore, in his opinion, the
product should not be considered an analog of a controlled substance. In McDougars opinion
letter, Utah law was not addressed. McDougal discussed the structural compound of AM-694
and XLRJ 1 and the chemical effects of the substance. TI1e experts for Mike's Smoke Shop
did not test or analyze the actuaJ products. They merely stated that in their opinion XLRl 1
should not be considered an analog of AM-694.
7. Kyle Best admitted that he knew the product they sold as "'aroma therapy" was being
ingested by at least some of the people that purchased it. This despite the fact that Mike's
Smoke Shop marketed it as "aroma therapy''P and not for human consumption. He also
admitted to smoking ii- himself on at least one occasion. Kyle Best told the police officers
that a company called "GOS" manufactured the uRebom" product but he didn't know where
GOS was located. When the police officer asked for a copy of the test results for "Reborn",
Kyle Best provided a report from AIBio Tech. TI1e test results were for 36 chemicals;
however the product was not tested for any analogs and did not identify the chemical makeup
of the product. The lab report was addressed to a business listed as ,. DVS" with a St. George
address; however no such business existed at that address and no business called '~DVS" had
a business license with St. George. Kyle Best stated that he had offered ..'Reborn" for sale in
the store for at least 6 months. He said he moved the "Reborn!>' under the counter behind the
cash register because people were stealing it and that people have broken into the store to
steal it. He said Mike's Smoke Shop in St. George sells the "Rebomi' for SJ0 a packet and
they sell 50 to 60 packets a day. Kyle Best said that he does the ordering and that the owners
4
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are aware of and approve items that are offered for sale and that he was told to sell this
product. He also stated that ·he wouldn't sell the product if the person asks for "spice" and
that about a l/3 of his sales are l~Rebom''. When asked why the "Reborn" was hidden if it
was such a hot seller, he responded that he didn't have room for the "Reborn'' out front, that
it made it easier to grab, and that it would get stolen. When asked why he didn't put it in the
glass display case, he responded that it had been but he moved it. He agreed other businesses
would display their hot selling items out front. He also stated that customers have to ask for it
by name to get it. Kyle Best said that he knew customers _smoke it or ingest it like marijuana
including one old man who smokes it for his cancer and comes in every other day. He also
admitted that he has used it in the past. When asked what effect the HRebom" had, he said it
made him sick. When asked if it was ~afe to say that no matter what name the "spice" was
called~ whether it was called "Reborn" or "aroma therapy', it was camouflage to skirt the law
enforcement investigations, Kyle Best said "Yeah''. He said that people will find ways to get
high.

@

Christie Best, the owner, told Task Force officers that she wasn't ''dwnb'' and that she knew
what people were doing with the ''aroma therapy''. She also said customers had told her that
they smoke it. Christie said that she comes to the St. George store two to three times a week
to do paperwork, pay bills and sign checks. She said the "Rebom'' product was kept behind
the counter and in the safe and that she left the testing of the product up to Kyle Best. She
said that when the store is broken into the first thing the thief steals is the nRebomn.
TI1e manager of the Washington City store, Christina Best, daughter of the owner, also
admitted to seeing people smQke the ;''aroma therapy" in tbe parking lot, that people admitted
they smoked it and that she had smoked it once. She also kept the product hidden behind the
counter in the Washington store and said that the customer had to know about it and request
it or they wouldn.''t sell it to the customer.
Michael Connors, one of the owners, said they got their "aroma therapi' from a male he only
knows by a first name and he asks Kyle Best ifit is legal, if the paperwork is in order and if
the attorneys have cleared it. Connors said he hides the "'aroma therapy' behind the register
because ifhe displays it, it becomes illegal. He also said.he puts it out of view so kids can't
get it.

CONCLUSIONS
Based on tbe facts presented at the hearing including_all submitted materials, the City
Council makes the followingconc]usions:·
1. In examining the eviden_ce presented, the Council must detennine whether the evidence
supports the business license officer's revocatien of Mike,s Smoke Shop's business license.
The Utah Supreme Court stated that "Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
This standard does not require or specify a quantity of evidence but requires only such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adeqtiate to support a
conclusion." J,VWC Holdings Co., Inc~ f~ Public Service Commission of Utah, 44 P.3d 714,
4
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2001 UT 23 (2002). Put simply, the decision cannot be arbitrary or capricious; it must be
based in fact.
2. The plain language of the Utah state statute is clear and should be applied as written. In State
v. Jeffs~ the Utah Supreme Court stated when '~interpreting a statute, we look to its plain
language. We read statutory provisions literally, unless such a reading would result in an
unreasonable or inoperable result." State v. Jeffs, 243 P.3d 1250 (Utah 2010). This decision
is supported by a review of House Bi11254 which
adopted by the 2012 Utah Legislature.
The State Legislature amended the law to clarify the definition of a contro1led substance
analog and eliminated the requirement to prove two elements before a substance could be
classified as an analog. Prior to this amendment, the prosecutor in a criminal case had to
prove that a substance had a chemical structure substantially similar to the chemical st~cture
of a contro1led substance or a listed control1ed substance AND that it had a substantially
similar effect OR was represented or intended to have a substantially similar effect The 2012·
amendments removed this two step approach from Utah law. Mike;s Smoke Shop argues the
language still requires this two step approach arguing that the elements should be read in the
conjunctive even though they are separated by an "or" instead of an "and". However, the
Legislature would not have removed the clear language using the word ''and'' which clearly
required two steps and changed it to three separate paragraphs using the disjunctive format of
''or"' if it really wanted to keep the requirement for two steps. Such an interpretation is
nonsensical and unreasonable.
The relevant changes are as follows:
HB 254:

was

78
(g) (i) "Controlled substance analog" means::
19
{Al a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical
80 structure of a controlled substance listed in Schedules 1 and I1 of Section 58~37-4 , a
substance
81
Listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or in Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances
Act,

82
83
84
85

Title II, P.L. 91-513[¾k
[(Aj] (B) a substance which has a stimulan~ depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the
central nervous system substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system ofcontrolled substances [in tl1e seheelwes set. felth ill

86
Subseetion (l)(f), er a sabs~anee listee in Seetion S8 37 4.2; er] listed in Schedules I and II o(
81 Section 58-3 7-4 • substances listed in Section 58-3 7-4.2 , or substances li..vted in Schedules I
and
88 JI ofthe federal Controlled Substances Act, Tit/ell, P.L. 91-513; or
89
[ts)] (C) A substance which, with respect to a particular individual, is represented or
90
intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system
91
substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on lhe central
92 nervous system of controlled substances [ia tlle sehesales er list set ferthin this Sahseetien
93 fl-t) listed in Schedules 1 and Il ofSection 58-37-4. substances listed in Section 58-37-4.2•.

or
94

substances listed in Schedules I and II ofthe federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II,

5
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Excerpt from enrolled copy of House Bill 254 enacted by the 2012 General Session ofthe
Utah Legislature.
It is clear from the cl-ianges that were made that the Legislature intended the statute to be
disjunctive as "or" is nonnally read, rather than '~conjunctive" as argued by Mike's Smoke
Shop. The Council concludes that the current law, especially with its history, is very clear
and should be applied in the disjunctive as it is written. When applied to the facts of this case
it does not create an unreasonable or inoperable result.

@

3. The product sold at Mike's Smoke Shop contained XLRll, an anaJog of AM-694. The
Council concludes that the evidence provided by the State Lab and Mr. Lamoreaux is

credible and reliable. It is reasonable to rely on the detennination made by,the State Lab that
the product sold or possessed by Mike's Smoke Shop with the intent to distribute, contained
XLRl l which has a chemical structure substantially similar to the chemical structure of the
listed controlled substance AM-694 and that the chemical had a common core structure with
a single point of divergence. In Unit.ed State$ v. Saffo, 227 F.3d 1260, 1263 ( I 0th Cir. 2000),
the government's expert witnesses testified that the substance in that case had a substantially
similar chemical structure to the listed controlled substance because there was only one
difference in tl1e chemical structure between the substance in question and the listed
controlled substance. The defendanfs ex:pert witnesses in Sqffo claimed the substance did not
have a substantially similar chemical structure because their functional groups were different.
The court stated that experts need not ~gree in order tc, affirm a criminal conviction under the
analog statute.
Based on this conclusion and the findings of fact stated above~ the Cou11cil concludes the
evidence establishes that XLR 11 is an analog of AM-694, a listed controlled substance, and
that Mike's Smoke Shop so1d and possessed product with the intent to distribute that
contained XLRl 1 in violation ofU.C.A. 58-37-8.
4. The Council finds that Mike's Smoke Shop had notice that the product they sold was a
controlled substance that was illegal to distribute and the City is not required to prove intent
on the part of Mike's Smoke Shop.
The case before the Council is a civil business license revocation. Civil business license
revocations do not require an intent.element. The mere fact th.at a sale of an illegal substance
was made at the business is sufficient to justify the revocation of the business license.
Owners and operators are responsible for the activities that occur at their businesses. It is
their responsibility to ensure compliance with the law. Assuming arguendo that the City had
to prove intent, the standard C>f proof us~ to measure an individua)'s level of mens rea in a
criminal case would be whether the individual had a "reasonable cause to believe" or reason
to know that their actions are iltegal. This can be shown 'by the subjective facts surrounding
the event in question which demonstrates that the person had reason to know their acts were
illegal.
6
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In another criminal case, U1Jited States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926t 929 (8th Cir. 2002), the
defendant, in an attempt to circumvent the banned chemicals, found a chemical, 1,4
Butanediol, to sell that was not on the controlled chemicals list, but that had similar effects to
those illegal chemicals when ingested. The defendant also had "not for human consumption'•
placed on the packaging of tbe chemical. in hopes of persuading law enforcement that the
chemicals were not intended to be used in the same manner as the listed controlled chemicals
GHB and GLB. The court concluded in Washam that while the chemical 1A Butanediol did
not have the exact same chemical structure, and even though the packaging had a ]abel
stating "not for human consumption," the surrounding facts proved that the defendant knew
the chemical was substantially similar to the listed controlled chemicals, and the defendant
knew that the analogous chemical would be consumed by those who purchased the chemical,
even if the packaging advised otherwise. Similarly, the Saffo court he1d that the defendant
could not claim lack of notice because her behavior and activities showed she knew selling
the product was illegal.
In the case at hand, the facts are similar to Saffo and Was/ram . ''Reborn\\ a product which
contained the analog of a listed controlJed substance, was sold or possessed with the intent to
distribute at Mikel!s Smoke Shop located at 1973 W Sunset Blv~ St. George, Utah. It was
marked "'not for human consumption"\ it was sold for $10 a packet from a hidden location
distinct from the legal inventory, it was rung up by scanning a tag on the monitor instead of
marking the product, the customer had to specifically request it to buy it. and the owners and
employees knew that the customers were smoking or ingesting it. If a customer asked for
spice they would be told that the store does not seJJ spice, but that they sell uaroma therapy".
The employees' and owners' conduct demonstrates an understanding of the illegality of the
product, and that the customers buying the product were not using it for its advertised use of
aroma therapy. Kyle Best, the manager of the store, even stated that these acts were to

mislead Jaw enforcement. The totality of these facts, in addition to those listed above in the
findings of fact, establishes there is "reasonable cause to believe.. the ownerst the manager
and the employees knew the product was illegal. 111is is the standard for a criminal
conviction, a much higher standard than is necessary for a business license revocation. In
addition, the Fifth District Court held a hearing to determine if there was sufficient evidence
to proceed on. criminal charges against Kyle Best for distributing a controlled substance
stemming from the events which occurred in January 2013, and the Court ruled that there
was sufficient evidence for a criminal prosecution. The criminaJ case against Kyle Best is
based on the same facts as this revocation.
The Council concludes that based on the totality of the facts, there is substantial evidence that
Mike's Smoke Shop, its owner and employees, had the requisite knowledge and intent to
commit a violation of the law by distnouting, or possessing with the intent to distribute,
analogs of an illegal substance. This evidence goes far beyond what is required for a
business license revocation, but is demonstrative of the weight of the evidence supporting the
decision to revoke Mike"s Smoke Shop's business license.
The City has authority under its business license ordinance to revoke a license when it
finds that the licensee/owner/operator is in violation of Section 3-J-19 of the St. George
Municipal Code by violating any drug related offense or by finding that an employee while on
the business~s premises violates any laws related to controHed substances. No criminal
7
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conviction
or charge is required. The City is simply required
to show by substantial evidence that
.
.
there was a violatjon. Substantial evidence is "that quantum and quality ofrelevant evidence that
11
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Jl St. Gym, lite. v. Salt
Lake Ci(y Corp., 2008 UT App 127, 183 P .3d 262,265.

ORDER
Based on all _the facts in this case, the Cmmcil hereby upholds the business license
officer's decisio,n to revoke the business license_for Mike' s Smoke Shop as a result of the
business being in violation of Section 3-1-19 of the St George Municipal Code, and hereby
ORDERS Mike's Smoke Shop to cease conducting business in the City of St. George anq shall
cease operations at 1973 W. Sunset Boulevard in St. George, Utah no later than 4:00 p.m . on
July 31 , 2013. Pursuant to Section 3-1-20 of the St. George Municipal Code; a business that has
had its license revoked shall not qe granted a business license for six months following the
revocation. Any subsequent busihess license application shall be subject to all applicable
Municipal Codes at the time ofthe applicati.on.
DATED this l 8111 day of July, 2013.

CITY: City of St. George

{), >#1, ~

ATTEST:

~L
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Tab 2

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MIKE'S SMOKE, CIGAR & GIFTS,

DECISION AND ORDER AFFIRMING
BUSINESS LICENSE REVOCATION

Petitioner,
Case No. 130500429

vs.

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
Respondent.

Petitioner Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts has filed a Petition for Judicial Review,
challenging the City of St. George's ("City") decision upholding the revocation of its business
license. Foilowing remand from the Court of Appeals, the court once again heard oral argument
on October 21, 2015, at the conclusion of which it took the matter under advisement. As
explained below, the City Council's decision is affirmed.

Standard of Review
The parties previously disputed the standard of review, but the Court of Appeals clearly
resolved that question:
"Judicial review of license revocations by municipalities is limited to a
determination whether the municipality acted within its lawful authority and in a
manner that is not arbitrary or capricious." Daily Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City of
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ,r 42, 13 P.3d 581 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). This court has indicated that a "municipality's license revocation
decision is deemed arbitrary or capricious if it is not supported by substantial

000624

evidence in the record." 14th St. Gym, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Com~ 2008 UT App
127, ,r 10, 183 P .3d 262 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This
standard does not allow the reviewing court to reweigh the evidence, Dairy Prod.
Servs., 2000 UT 81, ,r 42, 13 P.3d 581, but requires the court to "consider all the
evidence in the record, both favorable and contrary, and determine whether a
reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the [c]ity," 14th St. Gym,
2008 UT App 127, ,I IO, 183 P.3d 262.
Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 UT App 158, ,r 14,353 P.3d 626.

2012 Amendment to Utah's Definition of"Controlled Substance Analog"
The parties agree on the changes made in 2012 to the statutory provisions defining a
"controlled substance analog" in Utah. The following table demonstrates the changes between
the 2011 and 2012 versions of the statute (which, as far as this case is concerned, involve only
the structural changes to the statute (i.e., the movement of the initial provision into subdivision
(A), and the movement of former subdivisions (A) and (B) to (B) and (C), respectively)):
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2(g)(i) (as amended
in 2012).

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(g)(i) (2011 ).
(g)(i) "Controlled substance analog" means a
substance the chemical structure of which is
substantially similar to the chemical structure
of a controlled substance listed in Schedules I
and II of Section 58-37-4, a substance listed
in Section 58-37-4.2, or in Schedules I and II
of the federal Controlled Substances Act,
Title II, P.L. 91-513:

(g)(i) "Controlled substance analog" means:
(A) a substance the chemical structure of
which is substantially similar to the chemical
structure of a controlled substance listed in
Schedules I and II of Section 58--37-4, a
substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or in
Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513;

(A) which has a stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the

(B) a substance which has a stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the
2
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c~ntral nervous system of controlled
substances in the schedules set forth in
Subsection (l)(f), or a substance listed in
Section 58-37-4.2; or

central nervous system substantially similar to
the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system of
controlled substances listed in Schedules I
and II of Section 58-37-4, substances listed in
Section 58-37-4.2, or substances listed in
Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513; or

(B) which, with respect to a particular
individual, is represented or intended to have
a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system
substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the
central nervous system of controlled
substances in the schedules or list set forth in
this Subsection (1).

(C) A substance which, with respect to a
particular individual, is represented or
intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the
central nervous system of controlled
substances listed in Schedules I and II of
Section 58-37-4, substances listed in Section
58-37-4.2, or substances listed in Schedules I
and II of the federal Controlled Substances
Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513.

Utah and Federal Controlled Substances Analog Statutes
The relevant provisions of the 2012 version of the Utah statute overlap significantly with
~

the corresponding federal provisions, as indicated in the following table:
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-37-2(g)(i) (as amended
in 2012) (emphasis added).

21 U.S.C.A. § 802(32)(A) (emphasis added).
(32)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph
(C), the term "controlled substance analogue"
means a substance--

(g)(i) "Controlled substance analog" means:
(A) a substance the chemical structure of
which is substantially similar to the chemical
~

@

(i) the chemical structure of which is

3
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structure of a controlled substance listed in
Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, a
substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or in
Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513;

substantially similar to the chemical structure
of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;

(ii) which has a stimulant. depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system that is substantially similar to or
(B) a substance which has a stimulant,
greater than the stimulant, depressant or
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
central nervous system substantially similar to system of a controlled substance in schedule I
the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
or II; or
effect on the central nervous system of
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which
controlled substances listed in Schedules I
and II of Section 58-37-4, substances listed in such person represents or intends to have a
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect
Section 58-37-4.2, or substances listed in
on the central nervous system that is
Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled
substantially similar to or greater than the
Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513; or
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect
on the central nervous system of a controlled
(C) A substance which, with respect to a
substance in schedule I or II.
particular individual, is represented or
intended to have a stimulant. depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system substantially similar to the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the
central nervous system of controlled
substances listed in Schedules I and II of
Section 58-37-4, substances listed in Section
58-3 7-4 .2, or substances listed in Schedules I
and II of the federal Controlled Substances
Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513.

Competing Interpretations

Stressing the similarities between the Utah and federal statutes, Petitioner argues that the
two statutes should be interpreted similarly. Petitioner correctly points out that the cases
4
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interpreting the federal statute are virtually, if not entirely, unanimous in reading the statute
~

~

-..i)

conjunctively, as summarized in an ALR annotation discussing the subject:
The construction of the definition of controlled substance analogue in 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 802(32) has been a subject of controversy. The government has argued that it
should be construed in the disjunctive, so that a substance is a controlled
substance analogue if it satisfies either clause (i), (ii), or (iii). The only case so far
to adopt this disjunctive interpretation, however, has been reversed, and all cases
at this time have construed the definition in the conjunctive as requiring a
substantially similar chemical structure to a controlled substance (i), and then
either an effect similar to a controlled substance (ii) or the intent to have such an
effect (iii) ....
Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of Controlled
Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986, 188 A.L.R. Fed. 325 §2[a] (Originally published
in 2003; WestlawNext database updated weekly) (footnote omitted); id. §16 (collecting cases);
accord United States v. Ketchen, No. 1:13-CR-00133-JAW, 2015 WL 3649486, at *8 (D. Me.
June 11, 2015) (unpublished) ("Although the First Circuit has not addressed the issue, nearly all
(or perhaps all) circuit courts that have considered the question have concluded that § 802(32)(A)
should be read in the conjunctive.") (citations omitted). As explained below, the court cannot

~

properly follow this federal case law.
"Above all, this court's primary objective in construing enactments is to give effect to the
legislature's intent." LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41,, 11,215 P.3d 135 (emphasis added and
citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the court should "look first to the
statute's plain language." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "When the plain

5
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meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no other intemretive tools are
needed." Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted). Further, in conducting a plain language
analysis, the court may consider the effect of statutory amendments. See T-Mobile USA, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 2011 UT 28, iJ 27, 254 P.3d 752.
In its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order" ("Council Decision"), the City Council
compared the statute as it stood before and after the 2012 amendment, and concluded that "the
Legislature would not have removed the clear language using the word 'and' which clearly
required two steps and changed it to three separate paragraphs using the disjunctive format of
'or' if it really wanted to keep the requirement for two steps. Such an interpretation is
nonsensical and unreasonable." AR-00005 (Council Decision at 5). Without questioning this
interpretation of the 2012 amendment, 1 and without undertaking an analysis of the statutory
language to show that it can even bear a conjunctive construction, Petitioner simply urges the
court to follow the federal decisions holding that the federal statute should be read conjunctively.
The court declines this invitation.
As previously quoted, the language of the two statutes overlaps substantially. but there
are also critical differences requiring a departure from the federal lead. See Jensen v.

1

Petitioner actually goes as far as to affirmatively endorse this interpretation, saying, after
reciting the above excerpt from the Council Decision, that "[t]here is no question the legislature
intended for the amended UCA § 58-37-2(g) to be read in the disjunctive." Petitioner's Opening
Brief at 11.
6
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Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1984) (recognizing "that when the
vi)

Legislature adopts a statute from another state, the presumption is that the Legislature is familiar
with that state's judicial interpretations of that statute and intends to adopt them also," but stating
that the presumption "is not applicable where there have been material changes made in the
second statute") (emphasis added and citations omitted).
As relevant to the conjunctive/disjunctive question, the two statutes' chief similarity is

~

the connection of the three definitional subdivisions by the term "or" between the second and
third. The general rule is that when words are "used in series, the only connective being the
disjunctive 'or,' it applies to the whole series." Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287,289,333 P.2d
943, 944 (1959). Of course, as Petitioner emphasized at oral argument, this rule is not absolute.
In a case exemplifying the federal cases treating the language of the federal analog statute, the
Third Circuit reiterated that "canons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a
disjunctive be given separate meaning unless the context dictates otherwise,'' and that "[w]hether
requirements in a statute are to be treated as disjunctive or conjunctive does not always turn on

(.i)

whether the word 'or' is used; rather it turns on context." United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429,
436 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added and citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In deciding how "or" should be understood in Hodge (i.e., as applying to each of the three
subdivisions it connects or only to the final two), the court first noted that "even within § 802,
Congress did not always consider a single 'or' between the final terms of a series sufficient
7
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evidence of disjunctive intent"; the court referenced the fact that ''the definition of 'depressant or
stimulant substance' in§ 802(9) contains an 'or' after each clause,"2 and concluded that, as to
subdivision (32)(A), "where 'or' is absent between clauses (i) and (ii) but present between (ii)
and (iii), we do not find conclusive evidence for a disjunctive reading." 321 F.3d at 436 (citations
omitted). The basis for this initial conclusion is conspicuously absent in the Utah statute, which
defines "depressant or stimulant substance" by tracking the language of the federal definition
virtually verbatim, but omitting the "or" after the provisions corresponding with subdivisions (A)

2

Section 802(9) provides:

The term "depressant or stimulant substance" means-(A) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or any of the salts of
barbituric acid; or
(B) a drug which contains any quantity of (i) amphetamine or any of its optical
isomers; (ii) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of
amphetamine; or (iii) any substance which the Attorney General, after
investigation, has found to be, and by regulation designated as, habit forming
because of its stimulant effect on the central nervous system; or

(C) lysergic acid diethylamide; or
(D) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the Attorney
General, after investigation, has found to have, and by regulation designated as
having, a potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the
central nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect.
21 U.S.C.A. § 802 (emphasis added).

8
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and (B) of section 802(9). See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1).
The court next said "that the definition of a controlled substance analogue reads more
naturally in the conjunctive. First, clause (i) seems to state an independent requirement; even the
dictionary defines chemical analogues in terms of their similar chemical structures." 321 F.3d at
436 (citing American Heritage Dictionary 65-66 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "analogue" in chemistry
as "[a] structural derivative of a parent compound that often differs from it by a single
~

element")). The court immediately highlighted the limited value of this point, however, in a
footnote acknowledging "that arguments from dictionary definitions can only take us so far when
construing a provision that is itself definitional. Absent an absurd departure from conventional
English, Congress of course is free to define terms in statutes differently than any particular
dictionazy does." Id. at 436 n.5 (emphasis added). Accord Hercules Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 2000 UT App 372, ,r 9, 21 P.3d 231 ("When a statute fails to define a word, we rely on
the dictionary to divine the 'usual meaning."') (emphasis added and citations omitted).
Next, the court observed that
clauses (ii) and (iii) read in parallel and appear subordinate to clause (i) because
the functional language in each begins with the relative pronoun "which." The
doctrine of the last antecedent teaches that "qualifying words, phrases, and clauses
are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding" and not to "others
more remote." That suggests that clauses (ii) and (iii) more likely modify clause
(i)'s phrase "controlled substance in schedule I or II" than the word "substance" in
the main clause.
321 F.3d at 436 (citations omitted).
9
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Again, comparison with the corresponding provisions of the Utah statute shows that
applying the same analysis to the Utah statute yields a different conclusion. "[T]he functional
language in" subdivisions (B) and (C) of section 58-37-2(g)(i) begins, not with the word
"which," but with the phrase "a substance which" (emphasis added), reinforcing the conclusion
that each of these subdivisions is intended to stand on its own rather than modifying subdivision
(A).

After conducting its plain-language analysis, the Hodge court "readily concede[d] that the
disjunctive reading is plausible" based on "[t]he word 'or' between clauses (ii) and (iii)," but
concluded that the other features noted above made section 802(32)(A) "ambiguous as to
whether it should be read conjunctively or disjunctively." 321 F.3d at 436-37.
Because section 58-37=-2(g)(i) includes the same "or" between subdivisions (B) and (C),
but not the features that the Hodge court said made it possible to read § 802(32)(A) conjunctively
©
(except for the dictionary definition of "analogue," the significance of which the Hodge court
itself properly minimized), the court concludes that section 58-37-2(g)(i) is not ambiguous, and
that the plain meaning of the language in this subdivision requires it to be read disjunctively.
This interpretation of section 58-37-2(g)(i) is further supported by contrasting the 2011
and 2012 versions of the statute, as Petitioner freely admits. See footnote 1, supr~ and
accompanying text. This is also consistent with legislative history; the State has presented the
enrolled copy of the bill amending the statute in 2012, which expressly states that the bill
10
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"amends the definition of a controlled substance analog to allow proof that the substance is
1$

chemically substantially similar to a controlled substance, without requiring proof of the effect of
the substance by the expert testimony of a phannacologist .... " AR-00129 (H.B. 254 (enrolled
copy), lines 11-15), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2012/bills/static/HB0254.html (emphasis
added).
Despite acknowledging the Legislature's manifest intent that the statute be read

~

disjunctively, Petitioner nevertheless argues that it should be read conjunctively because to read
it disjunctively "renders it unconstitutionally vague." Petitioner'·s Opening Brief at 12.3
Importantly, however, Petitioner is not challenging the constitutionality of the statute.4 As
3

Petitioner has cited Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163, 92 S. Ct.
839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1972), for the proposition that a law is unconstitutionally vague if it
"makes criminal activities which by modem standards are normally innocent," and Lanzetta v.
State of NJ., 306 U.S. 451,453, 59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888 (1939), for the proposition that
"[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."
Petitioner argues that if the statute is interpreted disjunctively, it fails on both of these counts
because people who sell "aromatherapy products, caffeine, tobacco, or sugar" "are now left
guessing and hoping their conduct is lawful." Petitioner's Opening Brief at 15-16.
4

No doubt this is because, in order to c~allenge the statute's facial vagueness, as the City
correctly points out, "Defendant must show that the statute is totally invalid and 'incapable of
any valid application."' Salt Lake City.v. Lopez 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(citations and some internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, ,r 39, 322 P.3d 728. "[A] person 'who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing
other hypothetical applications of the law."' Id. (citations and some internal quotation marks
omitted). Petitioner makes no attempt to show that the statute is incapable of any valid
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Petitioner puts it, "the question is not whether the application of the statute in the present case is
unconstitutionally vague but rather whether the interpretation used by the City can withstand
vagueness challenges under the federal constitution and in light of federal law." Id. at 16. At oral
argument, Petitioner cited Utah Department of Transportation v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ,r 23,332
P .3d 900, and clarified that it is invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance, the premise of
which
is a presumption that the legislature "either prefers not to press the limits of the
Constitution in its statutes, or it prefers a narrowed (and constitutional) version of
its statutes to a statute completely stricken" by the courts. Thus, when a court
rejects one of two plausible constructions of a statute on the ground that it would
raise grave doubts as to its constitutionality, it shows proper respect for the
legislature, which is assumed to "legislate[] in the light of constitutional
limitations."
2014 UT 24, 9tf 23 (citations omitted).
Petitioner's argument is unpersuasive. First, as Carlson itself clearly explains, "[t]he
canon of constitutional avoidance is an important tool for identifying and implementing
legislative intent." Id. (emphasis added). Here, as already stated, there is no dispute as to the
Legislature's intent, so there is no need to apply this canon to "identify

• and implement•" it,

application, and the evidence in the record (summarized by the City at pages 28-29 of its brief
filed November 20, 2013) clearly shows that Petitioner's owners and manager "had knowledge of
the illegality of [their] activities, and thus this is not a situation where [they] 'could not
reasonably understand that [their] contemplated conduct is proscribed."' United States v. Saffo,
227 F.3d 1260, 1270 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
12
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much less to openly circumvent it. Accord McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2306-07,
~

192 L. Ed. 2d 260 (2015) (canon of constitutional avoidance "'has no application' in the
interpretation of an unambiguous statute") (citation omitted).
Second, Petitioner also incorrectly states that there is "a wealth of federal case law
directly on point which states unequivocally that a disjunctive reading of the language such as
that contained in UCA § 58-37-2(g) renders it unconstitutionally vague." Petitioner's Opening

~

Brief at 11-12. The cases cited by Petitioner, however, reach no such conclusion. Rather, they
merely identify some "absurdities" that could result from a disjunctive reading, such as
(regarding § 802(32)(A)(ii)) caffeine or alcohol qualifying as controlled substance analogs
(because, in concentrated form, their effects are similar to those of controlled substances), or
(regarding § 802(32)(A)(iii)), flour or sugar or any number of other harmless substances likewise
so qualifying (because represented by someone to have effects similar to those of a controlled
substance). See United States v. Turcotte, 405 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Vickery.
199 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2002), United States v. Forbes, 806 F. Supp. 232, 235 (D.

~

Colo. 1992). Such situations are not entirely hypothetical. See Hodge, 321 F.3d at 439
(overturning controlled substance analog convictions for sale of candle wax and flour mixture
misrepresented to be crack cocaine). 5

5

Petitioner also cites United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2002), in which a
defendant asserted - as part of a constitutional vagueness challenge to the federal analog law -
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Again, however, the federal cases cited were dealing with an ambiguous statute. Under
such circumstances, application of the absurd consequences canon makes sense. See Utley v.
Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, ~ 46, --- P.3d--- (opinion concurring in part of Durrant, C.J.,
for majority of court) ("If statut01y language lends itself to two alternative readings. we choose
the reading that avoids absurd consequences.") (emphasis added and footnote omitted); State v.
Redd, 1999 UT 108, ,r 12, 992 P.2d 986 ("Where we are faced with two alternative readings, and
we have no reliable sources that clearly fix the legislative ptypose, ... we interpret [the] statute
to avoid absurd consequences.") (quoted in Utley.. 2015 UT 75, ,r 46 n.15) (emphasis added).
Because section 58-37-2(g)(i) unambiguously requires a disjunctive reading, however, there is no
basis for applying the absurd consequences canon here. See Visitor Info. Ctr. Auth. of Grand
Cnty. v. Customer Serv. Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997)
("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no

that the law was subject to arbitracy enforcement because the food additive MSG (like the analog
substance the defendant was convicted of distributing) "also becomes GHB in the human body,"
thereby qualifying as a substance with a substantially similar chemical structure to a listed
controlled substance. In rejecting this argument, the court pointed out that the federal law
requires more than just a substantially similar chemical structure. Id. at 932. Petitioner's reliance
on Washam is misplaced. As stated, the court there was addressing a direct vagueness challenge,
not deciding whether the statute should be read conjunctively or disjunctively (which issue had
been decided in a footnote earlier in the decision, see id. at 930 n.2). Here, as previously
indicated, see footnote 6 and accompanying text, supr~ Petitioner makes no vagueness challenge,
so the arbitracy enforcement supposedly allowed by the statute is not an issue. See State v.
Anderson, 701 P .2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) ("It is a fundamental rule that this Court should
avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so.") (footnote omitted).
14
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room is left for construction.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Moreover,
contrary to Petitioner's argument that the statute will be unconstitutionally vague unless it is read

6

In addition to the "absurd consequences" canon, the court in Utley also discusses the
"absurdity doctrine," which "has nothing to do with resolving ambiguities," but which is applied
"to reform unambiguous statutory language where applying the plain language leads to results so
overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislator could have intended them." 2015 UT 75,146
(footnote omitted). To the extent this very limited canon has been invoked, the court declines to
apply it here. While at least one court addressing a vagueness challenge to an unambiguously
disjunctive analog statute has indicated that absurd consequences would prevent it from being
applied to someone possessing alcohol, see People v. Silver, 230 Cal. App. 3d 389, 395, 281 Cal.
Rptr. 354,357 (Ct. App. 1991) (where statute defined, with some exceptions, "controlled
substance analog" to "mean either of the following: ( 1) A substance the chemical structure of
which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance .... (2) A
substance which has, is represented as having, or is intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to, or greater
than, the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a
controlled substance," the court tersely rejected the argwnent that the statute "could be used to
convict a person of possession of alcohol," saying, "[t]he answer is that the statute will be
construed to avoid absurd consequences") (emphasis added and citations omitted), such
statement was dicta, and at any rate the court did not say that the statute would therefore be read
conjunctively, so the statement did not help the defendant there, who was prosecuted under the
substantially similar chemical structure alternative, and it does not help Petitioner here. In
another case involving an unambiguously disjunctive analog statute, the court took a more
circumspect approach that the court adopts as its own. See Robinson v. State, 783 S. W.2d 648,
650 n.4 (Tex. App. 1989) (declining to "address the constitutionality or alleged definitional
deficiencies of [a statutory provision] concerning the effects of substances because the stipulated
evidence and record only present[ed] evidence as to the structural similarity," and because the
court could not "pass on the validity of any part of the Controlled Substance Act which [was] not
shown to have been violated, nor [could it] decide constitutional issues on a broader basis than
the record require[d]") (emphasis in original; citation omitted), aff d, 841 S. W.2d 392 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992) (en bane). Accord State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ,r 47,345 P.3d 1226, 1240
("[A] party may only challenge a statute 'to the extent the alleged basis of its infirmity is, or will
be, applied to his detriment.'") (citation omitted); Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1103 (court will not
reach constitutional issues wmecessarily).

•

15

000638

conjunctively, courts in other states have rejected vagueness challenges to analog statutes that,
like Utah's, are unambiguously disjunctive. See Silver, 230 Cal. App. 3d 389; Robinson, 783
S.W.2d 648. In sum, Petitioner's argument that the language of Utah Code section 58-37-2(g)(i)
should be read conjunctively is without merit.
Conclusion that XLR-11 Is a Controlled Substance Analog

Petitioner also assails the Council Decision rejecting the opinions of Petitioner's experts
and adopting the rather conclusory opinion of Terry Lamoreaux that "XLRl 1 has a chemical
structure which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of the controlled substance AM694 due to a common core structure with a single point of divergence." AR-00119.
It is not altogether surprising that Petitioner objects to the short shrift the City Council
apparently gave the reports of Petitioner's experts. Petitioner's experts certainly spent more time
explaining their opinions than Mr. Lamoreaux did his, and there is clearly room to quibble over
how accurately the Council Decision summarizes the bases for Petitioner's experts' opinions.
Nevertheless, the question before the court is whether the City Council could reasonably
have found that XLR-11 is an analog to AM-694, and that question must be answered in the
affirmative. As indicated in the preceding section, the Legislature clearly intended to make a
substantial similarity in chemical structure (between a listed controlled substance and another
substance) a sufficient ground on which to make the analog determination. Because Petitioner
does not challenge the statute's constitutionality, the only question is whether there is enough
16
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evidence for a reasonable person to conclude that XLR-11 's chemical structure is substantially
similar to that of AM-694. There clearly is.
Although, as indicated above, Mr. Lamoreaux's opinion is stated in somewhat conclusory
terms, Petitioner's own experts provided two-dimensional drawings for the chemical substances
in question (as well as for other substances). See AR-00206 and AR-00212. By reviewing these
drawings in connection with Mr. Lamoreaux's opinion, the City Council could reasonably
conclude that the chemical structure of the two substances is substantially similar (and that XLR11 is therefore an analog to AM-694). Cf. United States v. McKinney, 79 F.3d 105, 108 (8th Cir.
1996) ("[A] reasonable layperson could ... have examined a chemical chart and intelligently
decided for himself or herself, by comparing their chemical diagrams, whether the che~ical
structure of two substances were substantially similar."), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1226,
117 S. Ct. 1816, 13 7 L. Ed. 2d 1025 (1997). This same comparison would also enable the City
Council to reasonably disagree with the opinions of Petitioner's experts that the chemical
structures were not substantially similar. Thus, based on "the evidence in the record, both
~

favorable and contrary," the court determines that "a reasonable mind could reach the same
conclusion as the [C]ity [Council]." Mike's Smoke, Cigar & Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 UT
App 158, 114, 353 P.3d 626 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Conclusion

Because Petitioner has not shown either that Utah Code section 58-37-2(g)(i) should be
17
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read conjunctively, or that the City Council was not justified in concluding that XLR-11 is a
controlled substance analog, the court declines to disturb the City Council's decision upholding
the revocation of Petitioner's business license.

ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that:
1. the court affirms the City Council's decision upholding the revocation of Petitioner's
business license.
Dated this a'tt"'day of November, 2015.
BYTHECOU
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Tab 3

ADDENDUM3
Utah Code § 58-37-2(1)(g)(i)
(g)(i) "Controlled substance analog" means:
(A) a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the
chemical structure of a controlled substance listed in Schedules I and II of Section
58-37-4, a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or in Schedules I and II of the
federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513;
(B) a substance which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on
the central nervous system substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of controlled substances listed
in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, substances listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or
substances listed in Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances Act,
Title II, P.L. 91-513; or
(C) A substance which, with respect to a particular individual, is represented or
intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system substantially similar to the stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of controlled substances listed
in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, substances listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or
substances listed in Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances Act,
Title II, P.L. 91-513.

****
Utah Code § 58-37-8(1)
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;

(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:

STG_653622.1
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(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct that results
in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, Utah Controlled
Substances Act, 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, 37b, Imitation
Controlled Substances Act, 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act,
or 37d, Clandestine Drug Lab Act, that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, 37a,
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act,
37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act, or 37d, Clandestine Drug
Lab Act, on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.

****
28 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A)
(32)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the term" controlled substance
analogue" means a substance-(i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical
structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;

(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled
substance in schedule I or II; or
(iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends
to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous
system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in
schedule I or II.

****
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Utah Code§ 58-37-2(1)(1)
(1) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means:
(i) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or any of the salts of
barbituric acid;
(ii) a drug which contains any quantity of: (A) amphetamine or any of its
optical isomers; (B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of
amphetamine; or (C) any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human
Services or the Attorney General of the United States after investigation has found
and by regulation designated habit-forming because of its stimulant effect on the
central nervous system;
(iii) lysergic acid diethylamide; or
(iv) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the Secretary of
Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of the United States after
investigation has found to have, and by regulation designated as having, a
potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central
nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect.

****
21 u.s.c. § 802(9)
(9) The term "depressant or stimulant substance" means(A) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or any of the salts of
barbituric acid; or
(B) a drug which contains any quantity of (i) amphetamine or any of its optical
isomers; (ii) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of
amphetamine; or (iii) any substance which the Attorney General, after
investigation, has found to be, and by regulation designated as, habit forming
because of its stimulant effect on the central nervous system; or
(C) lysergic acid diethylamide; or
(D) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the Attorney
General, after investigation, has found to have, and by regulation designated as
having, a potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the
central nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect.
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Tab 4

ADDENDUM4
Statutory Comparison
Utah Code§ 58-37-2(1)(1)
(l) "D~pressant or stimulant substance"
means:

(i) a drug which contains any
quantity of barbituric acid or any of the
salts of barbituric acid;
(ii) a drug which contains any

quantity of: (A) amphetamine or any of
its optical isomers; (B) any salt of
amphetamine or any salt of an optical
isomer of amphetamine; or (C) any
substance which the Secretary of Health
and Human Services or the Attorney
General of the United States after
investigation has found and by
regulation designated habit-forming
because of its stimulant effect on the
central nervous system;
(iii) lysergic acid diethylamide; ~

(iv) any drug which contains any
quantity of a substance which the
Secretary of Health and Human Services
or the Attorney General of the United
States after investigation has found to
have, and by regulation designated as
having, a potential for abuse because of
its depressant or stimulant effect on the
central nervous system or its
hallucinogenic effect.
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21 u.s.c. § 802(9)

(9) The term "depressant or stimulant
substance" means(A) a drug which contains any
quantity of barbituric acid or any of the
salts of barbituric acid;~
(B) a drug which contains any
quantity of (i) amphetamine or any of its
optical isomers; (ii) any salt of
amphetamine or any salt of an optical
isomer of amphetamine; or (iii) any
substance which the Attorney General,
after investigation, has found to be, and
by regulation designated as, habit
forming because of its stimulant effect on
the central nervous system; ~
(C) lysergic acid diethylamide; ~

(D) any drug which contains any
quantity of a substance which the
Attorney General, after investigation, has
found to have, and by regulation
designated as having, a potential for
abuse because of its depressant or
stimulant effect on the central nervous
system or its hallucinogenic effect.

